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I. INTRODUCTION

It is not surprising that a religious view of punishment in
the afterlife involves fire and brimstone - the mental image of
being burned or dying in a fire is a terrifying thought that seems a
suitable basis for imagining and constructing the worst of all
possible worlds. Among the spectrum of fires in this world,
ranging perhaps from forest fires and volcanic eruptions to selfimmolation and car fires, a mattress fire is especially troubling: it
represents an element of the primordial intrusively triumphing over
the sacredness of the home, not to mention the bedroom. There are
reasons that our society glorifies firefighters as heroes and little
boys play with fire trucks. There are also reasons that flame
retardant chemicals in mattresses were not only regulatorily
sanctioned, but mandated. By introducing them into the mattress,
modern man can have a plush comfortable mattress and avoid the
specter of a mattress fire. All is well, or is it? This Article is not a
simple story of the regulation of mattress fires leading to the
introduction of a substitute risk in the form of exposure to flame
retardant chemicals that threaten our health. Instead, the history
and experience of mattress regulation will be used to support a
more general claim: economically motivated actors that exploit the
availability heuristic' tend to generate chemical products that
require heightened regulatory scrutiny. And this heightened
regulatory scrutiny should take the form of 1) shifting the burden
of proving safety from the government to industry and 2)
collaboratively working with consumers and industry to develop
safe substitute products, methods, and approaches that will address
the underlying problem. In other words, this Article suggests one

1The availability heuristic is the cognitive tendency for people to overestimate
the occurrence of an event if the event is easily brought to mind, or is
"available" in our consciousness. Events that are especially graphic and
traumatic, such as airplane crashes and house fires, tend to be subject to the
availability heuristic, meaning that people are inclined to believe that they occur
more often than they do.
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type of situation that should trigger application of one form of the
precautionary principle 2
A. The Dana-Sunstein Debate
David Dana and Cass Sunstein are among the
commentators who have identified that cognitive heuristics can
lead to problems in risk perception that present challenges for
environmental and health regulation. 3 Yet when these errors in
risk perception occur, Dana recommends application of the
precautionary principle, while Sunstein suggests usage of costbenefit analysis.4 Dana writes, "[T]he precautionary principle can
be understood as a corrective to cognitive biases favoring the
avoidance of sure, immediate losses over the avoidance of unsure,
non-immediate losses."5 Sunstein on the other hand has argued
that cognitive heuristics, including the availability heuristic, lead to
bias subject to exploitation by special interests, suggesting that this
should imply a full embrace of cost-benefit analysis in order to
expunge the irrational fears that grip society and tend to influence

The precautionary principle lacks a consistent definition among commentators.
For immediate purposes, one of the most widely cited articulations of it comes
from the Wingspread Statement of 1998: "When an activity raises threats of
harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically." Conference Report, Science and Envtl. Health Network, The
Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle (Jan. 26, 1998),
http://www.sehn.org/wing.html.
2

3 See also DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, ET AL., Group Report: Are Heuristicsa Problem

or a Solution? in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 103 (Gerd Gigerenzer and

Christoph Engel, eds. 2006); David A. Dana, EmpiricalLegal Realism: A New
Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior: A Behavioral
Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U.L. REv. 1315
(2003); Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation,74 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 630 (1999); and Timur
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascadesand Risk Regulation, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 683 (1999).
4 See Dana, supra note 4, at 1320; see also Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 3, at

753.
Dana, supranote 3, at 1316-17.
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regulators. 6 While Sunstein emphasizes that the existence of this
mistake in the appraisal of risk leads groups to take advantage of
the mistake for their own gain, he is most focused on the tendency
for certain advocacy and environmental groups to drum up
deranged, hysterical fears in order to generate support for policy
and legal changes. 7 Among the examples that Sunstein cites are
what now read as a standard list of environmental scares: the use of
the pesticide alar on apples, asbestos in schools, and Love Canal.8
What are arguably overreactions to problems such as these, leads
to what has been termed the "pollutant of the month syndrome." 9
Viewing this as a troubling development discordant with objective
realism, Sunstein asserts that cost-benefit analysis can function as a
methodological tool to introduce logical and evidentiary weight
into decision-making that will eliminate inaccurate risk
perception. 1
Dana has counterargued that cognitive biases, especially
those that overvalue the avoidance of definite immediate losses
relative to the avoidance of uncertain losses in the future, are so
powerful, pervasive, and infiltrative that they inevitably bias
public, political, and regulatory decision-making, even by experts,
in ways that provide inadequate protection against long-term
environmental harm." Dana uses the example of global climate
change to illustrate the bias: people view immediate cost increases,
such as gasoline taxes, to reduce global climate change as
unpalatable when the full repercussions of global climate change
are unclear and distant, perhaps both temporally and
geographically.1 2 The framing of the choice between "money and
hence economic welfare on the one hand and health and
environmental welfare on the other raises issues of
commensuration" and Dana goes on to suggest that the act of
6 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

(2005).
7

id

Id.at 83-84; Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 691-703.
9 Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L. J. 2637, 2650
8

(1998).

10SUNSTEIN,

supra note 6, at 129.
11See Dana,supra note 3.
12[d.
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attempting to reduce uncertain future health and environmental
losses to the same metric as immediate economic costs is
difficult. 13 If the choice is one between apples (i.e. economic
welfare) and oranges (environmental/health welfare), then
methodologies, often in the form of cost-benefit analysis, may seek
to convert everything into dollars, which tend to be synonymous
with economic welfare. In other words, the oranges must be
translated into apples. But this transmutative exercise is only
partially successful: if, to continue the analogy, health and
environmental losses are the orange, then the orange contains a
certain substance, and perhaps a lot of it, that cannot be converted
into the apple of economic costs. In Dana's example, the bias
against a full accounting of health and environmental losses
reflects the finding of loss aversion theory that people are risk
averse when it comes to a definite and immediate loss and riskpreferring when it comes to the possibility of a future loss. In
other words, the human animal is a gambler. If there is the
possibility of something dangerous coming down the road, we tend
to think we can avoid it. It is better to take our chances that we
may be able to work out the problem rather than to accept an
immediate loss in the here and now. Citing the work of Kahneman
and Tversky that found people preferred avoiding a certain loss of
$3000 in favor of rolling the dice with an 80% chance of losing
$4000 (which translates into a greater expected loss of $3200),
Dana describes the widespread myopia that afflicts us and affects
our environmental policies.14 Unable to escape this bias, our
regulatory system, forever trying to convert everything into apples,
should instead counter the inevitability of bias by embracing a
precautionary principle that will procedurally seek to elicit more
information by requiring that "the burden of putting forth evidence
regarding the prudence of not regulating an identified
environmental risk will be borne by the opponents of regulation."' 5
This Article is a continuation of Dana's project, with a
specific focus on chemical regulation, that is at a once a
refinement, expansion, and modification of his work. To begin
" Id. at 1320-21.
14 Id.

at 1321-22.

" Id. at 1328.
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with, Dana places a high degree of hope, and perhaps confidence,
that the precautionary principle will lead to the development of
better information and better analysis of information.16 This does
not depart so radically from the ends of Sunstein: both Sunstein
and Dana evince a belief that more and better information can be
attained - they part ways however on the means used to attain the
information, with Sunstein demanding cost-benefit analysis and
Dana arguing for the precautionary principle as a stop-and-think
measure that will require the production of evidence.
The
difficulty with Sunstein's approach, however, as the mattress case
study and other examples will illustrate, is that cost-benefit
analysis, among its myriad troubles, often validates and legitimates
rules, such as flame retardant standards, that end up having
immensely damaging effects on our health, safety, and well-being.
Cost-benefit analysis therefore, far from serving a cathartic
function revelatory of the truth, tends to catalytically and
conspiratorially create an illusion of safety and welfare
improvement.
Sunstein would likely argue that rather than
demonstrating the failure of cost-benefit analysis, the mattress case
study illustrates the need for more of it, along with better
information relating to precise quantification of the risks from
flame retardants. The information, however, if it ever comes in,
will come in too late. Societies and regulators must make ex ante
decisions about risks with incomplete information. And that is one
area in which this Article departs from Dana's approach. Where
Dana views the precautionary principle as ameliorative of
informational scarcity, this Article maintains skepticism that
procedural burden-shifting will produce meaningful evidence of
harm. To be sure, there may well be instances in which industry
can establish the safety of products, but more often than not,
proving safety will be comparable to the difficulties faced by the
government in proving that a chemical is unsafe. Therefore this
Article recommends not only that the precautionary principle shift
the burden of proof, but also that failing to establish safety serve
the de facto function of generating safe substitute responses to the
underlying problem (e.g. mattress fires). While industry of course
should not be mandated to develop a particular product,
16

Id.
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government can collaboratively work with industry and create
incentives in the form or subsidies or research rewards for the
development of safe substitute products. Social entities should
work together to solve problems, but should not be permitted to
fall back on chemical products that vitiate the fear associated with
the attachment of the availability heuristic to a particular situation.
As will be discussed, the precise contours of the new, substitute
response need not be precisely stipulated, but the law must be clear
that the old response will face a high burden of proof of safety, as
will any subsequent response. The most important step, then, is
the first one: regulatory, governmental, and societal suspicion
should attach to the exploitation of the availability heuristic by
companies that profit from the propagation of fear. Societal
constituencies should not succumb to corporate pressure to both
augment fear and then quell fear without regard for either the
legitimacy of the fear or the consequences of reducing the fear more colloquially, we should not kill an ant with a nuclear weapon.
Instead, our collective response should reflect the care, caution,
and understanding that tends to result from heightened scrutiny of
corporate behavior in prescribed circumstances.
B. The Availability Heuristic
Because the availability heuristic is a foundational element
of the approach put forth in the Article, a brief description of the
heuristic is necessary. The availability heuristic is cognitive
tendency of people to focus on certain readily identifiable and
accessible issues, concepts and explanations and, as a result, to
overestimate their occurrence.' 7 Vivid thoughts, whether borne of
repetition or a naturally graphic quality, are easier for us to latch
onto and emphasize in the course of decision-making. If an event
such as a plane crash or a mattress fire is easily brought to mind,
we tend to believe that the event occurs more often than it does.
In reality, the ease with which we can think of a particular event
has little bearing on its recurrence.18 There are of course important
n Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency andProbability,4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973).
8 Kuran & Sunstein, supranote 3, at 707.
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limitations to this logic, at least from an evolutionary perspective:
it is adaptive to learn to avoid repeating especially bad or traumatic
experiences. From the perspective of assessing risk in the world,
the availability heuristic, like other heuristics, represents a
necessary mental parsimoniousness and threat prioritization that
enables humans to function in the world.19 Our minds must draw
limits on information flows; at some point, decisions must be
made. 20 Nevertheless, countless studies have demonstrated that
people poorly judge risk in part because of the availability
heuristic: less salient risks such as heart disease and strokes are
underestimated, while more visible risks such as terrorist attacks
and house fires are overestimated.
C. Corporate Exploitation of the Availability Heuristic
This Article observes that corporations tend to exploit a
flaw in human risk perception: risks that are subject to the
availability heuristic are overestimated and risks that are distant,
Corporations
temporally and otherwise, are underestimated.
capitalize on overestimated risks by selling products that reduce
those risks but that create new and underestimated risks. This is
problematic from a legal and policy perspective because the gains
from the swap tend to be unduly privatized, while the costs of new
and excessive risk exposure are borne by the public. As the
purported vanguards of the public interest, the government has an
obligation to reduce public risks, especially if citizens, acting in
private capacities as consumers, have difficulty observing the risks.
To be sure, the problems such as mattress fires afflicted by the
availability heuristic are still genuine problems, even if they are
prone to exaggeration, and the government working in tandem with
societal constituencies should work to mitigate the danger. But the
government should not acquiesce to private interests that work to
substitute one form of public risk (e.g. mattress fires) with another
19 See

Russell Korobkin, The Problems with Heuristicsfor Law, in HEURISTICS
47 (Gerd Gigerenzer and Christoph Engel eds., 2006).
20 Id. Russell Korobkin notes, "If all judgments and decisions were
made only
after considering all relevant data, attaching subjective preference weights to all
possible outcomes, and creating probability predictions of each outcome, none
of us could complete the myriad cognitive tasks we face each day."
AND THE LAW
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(flame retardant exposure). Companies that are in the business of
exchanging one public risk for another should face a legal
obligation to demonstrate that the new public risk is sufficiently
minimal as to fall within our existing understanding of safety. If
this proves impossible, then the problem should be addressed so
that any solution is subject to safety assurances. It would then, of
course, be the prerogative of companies to develop new, safe
products. Government could work to address the initial public risk
through sensible regulations, by funding research and
development, and providing subsidies to generate safe products
that will reduce public risk.
While the basis of the Article's proposal is the mattress fire
case study, several examples from the recent and not so recent past
help to formulate, support, and solidify the proposal, even beyond
the realm of chemical regulation. Companies routinely create
intense fears that comport with the availability heuristic and then
sell products to alleviate the fears. Among these examples of
availability heuristics and their associated products that take away
the fear are: 1) the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 leading
to the growth in intelligence and defense private contracting; 2)
horrible diseases leading to the sale of snake oil in the 1930s; 3)
the Gulf Oil Spill leading to the application of dispersants; and 4)
the recent bed bug outbreak leading to the use of practically any
means necessary to kill bed bugs.
D. September 11, 2001 and the Military Industrial
Complex
In recent memory, perhaps the ultimate example of an
event that became the basis for the construction of an availability
heuristic was the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.
According to one survey in 2004, Americans estimated their
chance of serious harm from terrorism as 8.27%.21 Yet Sunstein
21

Cass R. Sunstein, Meador Lecture Series 2004-2005: Risk and the Law:

PrecautionsAgainst What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-CulturalRisk
Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 90 (2005), (citing Neal R. Feigenson et al.,
Perceptionsof Terrorism and DiseaseRisks: A Cross-NationalComparison,69
Mo. L. REv. 991, 998 (2004)).
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suggests that if there were one terrorist attack every year in the
United States that killed as many people as the September 11
attacks, the risk of death from terrorism is 0.001%.22 September 11
both affected the public in mundane ways, such as reducing air
travel in 2002, and monumentally important ways, such as
governmental decisions to wage a "War on Terror" that has
resulted in American troop deployment throughout the world,
including Afghanistan and Iraq.
For example, among the
statements of President George W. Bush in the lead up to the Iraq
War was: "Imagine those 19 hijackers [involved in the September
11 attacks] with other weapons and other plans - this time armed
by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, once
crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we
have ever known."23
Governmental statements, synchronized and tandemized
with private interests, laid the groundwork for a variety of entities
to exploit the September 11 availability heuristic to justify a
massive growth in the intelligence community and the military
industrial complex. A Washington Post investigation uncovered
1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies that
work on counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence in
about 10,000 locations in the United States. 24 Since September 11,
2001, 33 buildings have been constructed or are currently being
*
25
built to house * top-secret intelligence activities.
Army Lieutenant
General John R. Vines said with regard to the defense intelligence
system, "[b]ecause it lacks a synchronizing process, it inevitably
results in message dissonance, reduced effectiveness and waste.
We consequently can't effectively assess whether it is making us
more safe." 26 In a similar vein, the Washington Post quoted retired
Admiral Dennis C. Blair: "After 9/11, when we decided to attack
violent extremism, we did as we often do in this country. The
attitude was, if it's worth doing, it's probably worth overdoing."2 7
Id.
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003).
24 Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden
World, Growing Beyond Control,
22

23

WASH. POST, July 19, 2010.
25
26
27

id.
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Private contractors benefitted considerably, with the Washington
Post estimating 265,000 out of the 854,000 people with top-secret
clearances are private contractors. 28 Dana Priest and William
Arkin write:
Contractors kill enemy fighters. They spy on
foreign governments and eavesdrop on terrorist
networks. They help craft war plans. They gather
information on local factions in war zones. They
are the historians, the architects, the recruiters in the
nation's most secretive agencies. They staff watch
centers across the Washington area. They are
among the most trusted advisers to the four-star
generals leading the nation's wars.29
And of course, in addition to the intelligence community,
defense contractors and private security personnel and other
private contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq have benefitted
massively from two wars that were probably propelled, at least in
part, by the September 11 availability heuristic.
While
comprehensive data documenting the amount paid to private
intelligence and defense contractors after September 11, 2001 is
difficult to pinpoint, even conservative estimates suggest that tens
of billions of dollars have flowed to private contractors. 30 Former
Halliburton subsidiary KBR alone was paid more than $30 billion
since 2001.3 1 And while spending money on national defense and
counterterrorism as a reflection of a political perspective is one
thing, the federal Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan found, "[w]hile contractors provide vital services, the
Commission believes their use has also entailed billions of dollars
lost to waste, fraud, and abuse due to inadequate planning, poor
contract drafting, limited competition, understaffed oversight
Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, National Security Inc., WASH. PosT, July
20, 2010.
28

29

30

d
See

generally COMM'N

ON

WARTIME

CONTRACTING

IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN, AT WHAT COST? CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN, INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS (June 2009).
31
d. at 45.
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functions, and other problems." 32 In short, exploitation of the
September 11 availability heuristic has, by almost any measure,
been a boondoggle for private contractors.
E. Disease and Snake Oil
Terrible disease and illness functions not only as a subject
of the availability heuristic (i.e. it is easy to imagine various
diseases and hence overestimate their incidence) but as a reality:
people become sick and find themselves in vulnerable situations
desperately craving cures and treatments that may be for them the
difference between life and death, impaired living and normal
living, pain and a return to stasis.
The historical record
demonstrates that companies and individuals would sell snake oil,
literally, to desperate captive audiences.
In 1937, elixir
sulfanilamide poisonings killed over 100 people seeking antibiotic
treatment.33
Of course, these mass poisonings created an
availability heuristic of their own, which engendered intensive
regulation. It could be argued that the crucial aspect of the
situation was the fact that the poisonings forced a stagnant
legislature to act. But arguably, the precedential event was the fear
of death and sickness in the first place, which led companies to
generate drugs that either cause harm or were of dubious
effectiveness. This wave of "snake oil poisonings" illustrates the
damage wrought by economically motivated actors exploiting the
availability heuristic, until of course their products cause mass
killings and create an availability heuristic of their own. To a
significant extent, the capacity of a drug to have harmful side
effects, which, after all, is intended to have positive primary
effects, comports with our intuitive sense of danger. It is perhaps
32 Press Release, Comm'n on Wartime Contracting
in Iraq and Afghanistan,

Congressional Hearing June 10, 2009: Commissioners testify to House
Committee on Interim Report available at http://wxvww.wartimecontracting.
gov/index.php/hearings/congressional/hear-ing2009061 0 (announcement
of
Congressional hearings on the interim report by members of the commission).
3 Carol Bellentine, Sulfanilamide Disaster: Taste of Raspberries, Taste of
Death, The 1937 Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, June

1981, available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Product
Regulation/SulfanilamideDisaster/default.htm
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easier to see the potential for risk in ingesting a purported drug,
even if we have little idea what the risks actually are. In any event,
Congress acted in the aftermath of the snake oil poisonings to pass
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 34 FDA regulation thus
gained a strong foothold reflective of public and political will
decades ago, while chemical regulation in the United States
remains comparatively anemic.
F. The Gulf Oil Spill and Dispersants
The Gulf Oil Spill led to the construction of a significant
availability heuristic, as has also been pointed out with regard to
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 35 The visual image of "oil on the
beach" is worse in terms of human perception than oil under the
sea. The economically motivated actors are of course BP (seeking
to avoid the cost of additional liability that would accrue from
horrifying beach imagery) and the dispersant manufacturers
(seeking to profit from the sale of dispersant). In terms of systemic
demand, the EPA and other government actors had seemingly done
practically nothing over decade to test the potential harm of
dispersants. Then, in the midst of crisis, the government was either
too weak to stand up to BP to stop dispersant usage, was
victimized by internecine splintering in which the Coast Guard
won out over the EPA, or benefitted itself from the use of
dispersants that hid the severity of the crisis. To the credit of the
federal government, questions (at least from Congress) have arisen
about dispersants, but it is clear that in the heat of the moment the
government did not behave in precautionary way. As of the
writing of this Article, the implications of dispersant usage remain
unknown, but there is a widespread consensus that it would have
been beneficial to subject dispersants to rigorous scientific testing
years ago, rather than apply them in the midst of an oil spill and
then hope for the best.

d
35 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 93 (2002).
34
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G. Bed Bugs and Pesticides
Local news reports of the "Attack of the Bed Bugs" while
perhaps comical, are surely no laughing matter for those with
infestations. Pesticide companies, perhaps facing less vigorous
revenues from growth in organic farming and from green
consumer aversions to pesticides, may have identified a new
revenue stream. While of course no one is claiming that bed bugs
have been set loose by the pesticide companies, there is strong
evidence of the availability heuristic at work: New York has
formed a bed bug "battle plan" and media reports portray the
insects as "blood-sucking vampires."3 6 The hyperbolic portrayals
of the bed bug play into our notion of physical harm - after all, bed
bugs are essentially harmless (bites cause itching but do not
transmit disease). So the availability heuristic works to concoct
imaginary harm and also plays into other emotions: privacy
(invasion of the bedroom) and disgust (bed bugs are associated
with uncleanliness).
As fear and paranoia grow, pesticide companies are all too
ready to quell the fear. People probably are not applying pesticides
in order to prevent bed bugs (although they do apply pesticides to
prevent cockroach and termite infestations), but if a bed bug
infestation develops, fear is likely to lead to an overreaction and an
overapplication of pesticides. Rather than engage in integrated
pest management or use methods such as freezing or heating to
eliminate bed bugs, people become more likely to call the
exterminator to perform a fumigation.
The government, not acting in accordance with this
Article's prescription of precaution in the face of uncertainty, fans
the flames and increases systemic demand. During the height of
the recent bed bug crisis in August 2010, members of the Obama
Administration had a meeting in Ohio to form an action plan among those in attendance was a representative from the

Lynn Bruno, A real nightmare: Bedbugs biting all over the U.S., MSNBC
(July 27, 2010, 7:18 PM) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38382427/ns/healthmore health news.
36
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Pentagon. 37 The meeting was partly a response to the State of
Ohio petitioning the EPA for permission to use Propoxur, an
insecticide that had been removed from home use in the 1990s due
to its impact on the nervous system of children.3 8 The larger
concern becomes the implication in media reports that the only
solution is extermination with pesticides. This reinforces the
sentiment that the pesticides are the solution to pest problems as a
general matter. As will be described in the mattress fire case
study, usage of flame retardants in some contexts tends to lead to
their usage in other contexts; likewise, a pesticidal response to bed
bugs suggests the appropriateness of using pesticides for other
threats. Systemic demand to eliminate bed bugs also promotes the
traditional stigma associated with having bed bugs: our society,
viewing bed bugs as completely unacceptable, will use aggressive
means to kill them. Rather than sending a representative from the
Pentagon to work on an action plan, the federal government should
give heightened scrutiny to the chemicals used to kill bed bugs and
other pests.
Substitute methods such as integrated pest
management, freezing, and heating should be recommended. And
the government should avoid fanning the flames of hysteria.
H. A Roadmap
With these four examples in mind as a backdrop, this
Article will use the mattress fire case study as a basis to construct a
new legal approach to address exploitation of the availability
heuristic by economically motivated actors. The Article proceeds
in four parts. Part I describes the project of reducing and defining
the precautionary principle to apply to certain contexts in order to
lead to improved practical outcomes. Part II explores current
recommendations and theories of chemical regulation with
particularized emphasis on the conventional approach of risk
quantification. Part III presents the mattress case study as the basis
Nina Burleigh, Ohio Turns to Fedsfor Help in Battle Against Bedbugs, TIME,
Aug. 18, 2010.
38 See U.S. EPA, U.S. EPA 738-R-97-009, Reregistration Eligibility Decision
(RED): Propoxur (1997)
available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/
reregistration/REDs/2555red.pdf.
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for a proposed rule that exploitation of the availability heuristic to
construct systemic demand should trigger of application of the
precautionary principle. Finally, Part IV describes the legal nature
of the precautionary response: shifting the burden of proof and the
developing substitute approaches and products.
II. CONTEXT SPECIFICATION FOR APPLICATION OF THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

A. The Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave
David Dana, Cass Sunstein, and Stephen Gardiner, among
others, have worked to distill and crystallize triggers of the
precautionary principle and this Article continues the specification
of contexts that should alert regulators to apply the precautionary
principle. 39 Limiting the application of the precautionary principle
to certain situations represents a necessarily incremental approach.
Widespread regulatory application of the precautionary principle in
the United States is a fantastical dream, or nightmare, depending
on political perspective, but regardless is highly unlikely. While
some have attacked the precautionary principle as a theoretical
impossibility since any precautionary step necessarily creates new
risks of its own, most opponents of the idea have simply been able
to assert that this is America after all, the land of the free (don't
tread on me) and the home of the brave (risk-takers), and
Americans feel at home with rigorous methodological economic
approaches such as cost-benefit analysis, even if it turns out that
they only create the illusion of truth and improvement in human
welfare. Of course, some have pointed out that the United States is
not as hostile, nor Europe as friendly, to the precautionary
principle as is commonly supposed. 40 And on both sides of the
See David A. Dana, The ContextualRationalityofthe PrecautionaryPrinciple
QUEEN'S L.J., (forthcoming n.d.), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521802;
Dana, supra note 3; Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91
CORNELL L. REv. 841 (2006); and Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary
Principle,14 J. of Political Philosophy 33 (2006).
40 See Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the
Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
39

INT's L. 207 (2003).
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pond, political theorists, philosophers, and economists have
struggled with what is perceived to be the limited theoretical rigor
of the precautionary principle. More important are the practical
problems: the overriding and inexorable fact remains in 2011 that
American legislators and regulators seeking to require anything
approaching a precautionary principle will face an America that
will not go along, seemingly politically incapable of significant
change. It is an America that tends to believe that a strong
precautionary principle is at best a simple saying of "better safe
than sorry" 4 1 that should be in the back-of-the-head of regulators
and at worst an overly broad device concocted by environmental
health advocates and legal theorists with the ulterior motive of
paralyzing economic activity.
Yet, to the extent there is
widespread consensus that current environmental health and safety
regulations, and especially chemical regulations, are probably
insufficiently protective of our health, we must ask ourselves what
we should do?
B. Toward a "Core Precautionary Principle"
If the precautionary principle as typically articulated and
understood is too broad, then one response would be to limit the
principle's application to specific circumstances that leave us with
a "core precautionary principle."4 2 Stephen Gardiner embarked on
the project of bringing clarity and meaning to the precautionary
principle by proposing that the Rawlsian criteria for the application
of the maximin principle 43 synchronize with criteria that would be
Frank Cross, ParadoxicalPerils of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 53 WASH.
AND LEE L. REV. 851, 851 (1996).
42 Gardiner, supra note
39 at 34.
43 Drawing from the work of John Rawls, the maximin principle can be
understood to mean that policies should be selected based on whether they
provide the best worst-case outcome. As Cass Sunstein writes in his book Laws
of Fear: Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple,this could mean "asking officials
to identify the worst case among the various options, and to select that option
whose worst case is least bad." 60 (2005). John Rawls' maximin principle
articulated in his Theory of Justice states: "The basic structure is just throughout
when the advantages of the more fortunate promote the well-being of the least
fortunate, that is, when a decrease in their advantages would make the least
fortunate even worse off than they are. The basic structure is perfectly just when
41
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sufficient, though not necessary, for application of the
precautionary principle.44 Gardiner describes these three criteria
as: (1) significant uncertainty about the possible outcomes of
decision-making; (2) the gains above the minimum level
guaranteed by the maximin are not especially meaningful; and (3)
the presence of grave risks.45 At first blush, these criteria do not
seem to elevate the approach much beyond cost-benefit analysis
accompanied by significant uncertainty: the first criterion
represents ineliminable uncertainty, the second criterion represents
benefits, and the third criterion represents costs. Faced with
uncertainty, the specter of grave risks overwhelms the analysis.
Gardiner suggests that this highlights the threat of disaster as one
circumstance in which the precautionary principle is appropriate.
C. Sunstein's Catastrophic Harm Principle and
Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle
Building on the Gardiner/Rawls approach, Cass Sunstein
suggests that the maximin option may be appropriate as long as it
does not result in significant measurable costs and can avoid an
especially horrible worst-case scenario.46 If a catastrophic disaster
could be avoided relatively cheaply, then we should take these
inexpensive steps to prevent a horrific outcome. Sunstein also
states that genuine uncertainty in the environmental domain, while
rare, does exist, even among expertized regulators47 , although he is
quick to point out that regulators should be able to make a rough
assessment of the worst -case scenario together with the cost of
the prospects of the least fortunate are as great as they can be." Collected Papers
38 (1999).
44 Gardiner, supranote 39, at 47-8. This means that other possible routes exist to
justify the application of the precautionary principle.
45 Gardiner, supra note 39, at 47.
46 Any course of action will change the circumstances facing a decision-maker
such that a new worst-case scenario will be generated once a prior worst-case
scenario is foreclosed due to a particular course of action. This hinges on the
decisionmaker being able to exercise some degree of control over a situation,
even if the control is imperfect and the system remains in flux due to external,
uncontrollable stimuli.
47 Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic,91 CORNELL L. REV. 841,
885-86 (2006).
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avoiding the worst-case scenario, even if they lack information that
would allow them to assign probabilities to different outcomes.
This leads Sunstein to formulate what he terms the Catastrophic
Harm Precautionary Principle: if there are "uncertain dangers of
catastrophe when the cost of reducing those dangers are not huge
and when incurring those costs does not divert substantial
resources from extremely pressing problems," then regulators
should choose a course of action that prevents catastrophe.4 8
Sunstein supplements the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle with the concept of irreversibility: if a particular course
of action will yield irreversible consequences of an extreme nature,
then regulators should err on the side of an alternative course of
action that could preserve reversibility. He is correct to point out
specific circumstances that should lead us to err on the side of
caution, but to limit these circumstances to the catastrophic and
irreversible amounts to an undermining of the precautionary
principle through its limitation to events that appear extreme from
an ex ante perspective. While there is certainly virtue in the
project of describing circumstances that necessitate precautionary
approaches, Sunstein's method works a danger: describing
precaution as applying to perhaps only obvious and catastrophic
risks implies that other risks are palatable, when in fact they may
only appear palatable because they are poorly understood. Rather
than Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle or Catastrophic
Harm Precautionary Principle (which could in fact justify the
usage of flame retardants to avoid mattress fires - after all,
mattress fires that result in death surely are irreversible and
catastrophic for the decedent), what is needed is an elucidation of
more circumstances, and circumstances perhaps more specific than
those posited by Sunstein, that justify its application.
D. Precautionary Contextualization
Gardiner adopts a broader view of the conceivable
sufficient circumstances that would justify the application of the
precautionary principle, emphasizing that the goal must be to
describe "the relevant circumstances under which the
48

Id. at 892-94.
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precautionary principle is operative, by making clear what kinds of
threats and uncertainty trigger the precautionary principle and what
kinds of precaution are thereby triggered.",49 Similarly, Douglas
Kysar writes that the precautionary principle "focuses on particular
categories of harm and separates them out for special treatment
during early stages in the development of human knowledge and
experience."5 o
And David Dana has embarked on this
specification of contexts that call out for application of the
precautionary principle, describing two such contexts: 1)
heuristical bias towards irrational overweight of the avoidance of
immediate determinate loss and irrational underweight of the
avoidance of future indeterminate loss and 2) profit motives lead
market actors to thoroughly explore a product's possible benefits
but neglect inquiry into its adverse effects.5 1 With regard to the
first context, Dana describes the historical regulatory inaction in
the face of climate change, explaining that the certain cost to the
economy of reducing carbon dioxide emissions weighs more
heavily in the minds of all of us than the uncertain losses that could
occur from climate change.52 With regard to the second context,
Dana uses the example of nanotechnology to demonstrate that the
progenitors of new technologies effervescently investigate and
laud the benefits of their product, but avoid investing in "adequate
pre-market and post-market testing and surveillance."53 He
specifies several conditions that militate against companies
searching for and disseminating evidence that their products harm:
"when particular products pose theoretical risks but not
empirically-established ones; when any adverse effects will likely
occur only in the relatively distant future; and when the link
between the product and any distant adverse effects could well
escape notice, or at least be difficult to establish as a matter of 'but
for' causation." 54

49 Gardiner, supra note 39, at 38.
50

Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity

Costs, 22 J. LAND USE AND ENVTL. LAW 1, 14 (2006).
51See Dana supra note 39.
52

Id. at 8.

53
54 Id. at 19.
[d.
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E. Toward a New Rule
In relation to Dana's work, this Article draws elements
from the two categories he describes as justificatory of the
precautionary principle, and then adds to them in order to create a
new third stand-alone category. This new category results from
the application of the rule: if the availability heuristic is exploited
by economically motivated actors to construct systemic demand
for chemical products, then those chemical products should be
subject to the precautionary principle.
This proposed rule represents a combination of Dana's
separate categories to set the stage for systemic demand
construction, thereby creating a more pernicious and exploitative
outcome than Dana envisions. Where Dana identifies the capacity
for the profit motive to lead companies to explore product benefits
and ignore product risks, he does not specifically identify the
tendency for companies to exploit the availability heuristic.
Instead, his first category incorporates the concept of cognitive
bias leading to overvaluation of avoidance of certain losses, but
views it agnostically, as a feature of human existence, rather than
as a human tendency that corporations are practically required to
exploit in order to adhere to corporate laws mandating
maximization of short-term shareholder profit. He writes of the
availability heuristic: "The myopic focus on immediate losses also
may reflect the availability bias, as such losses typically are easier
to imagine than losses that would occur, if at all only years hence,
and the optimism bias, whereby people may be believe, even in the
absence of factual basis, that with time they will find a costless
means to avoid future risks."5 5 Dana views the development of
what he terms the "myopia bias" as well as the preference for
avoidance of sure losses over the avoidance of unsure losses as
perhaps inevitable, noting that "some have speculated it has deep
roots in evolutionary biology" but he does not construe its
propagation as beneficial to vested interests. 56 This leads him to
optimistically prescribe regulators to search for better information,

5
56

Dana supra note 3, at 1325.
d.
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without necessarily calling for formal burden shifting. And he
views the burden to be shifted as the more lenient burden of
production rather than the burden of proof.5 8
In contrast to Dana's categories, the category presented in
this Article involves an economically motivated actor mounting a
campaign to take advantage of an availability heuristic, thereby
creating systemic demand for chemical products. 59 This activist
tactic by profit-motivated corporations calls out for heightened
regulatory scrutiny - the difference in the description of this
category with Dana's categories leads to a more ambitious
prescription: the burden of proving safety must shift to industry
and failing that, substitutes must be developed. This is not
necessarily a disagreement with Dana's propositions. It is simply a
description of additional circumstances that necessitate giving even
greater scrutiny to a situation. The problem described in this
Article applies most appropriately to chemical regulation, in part
because of the largely ineradicable uncertainty associated with the
health and environmental effects of chemicals and in part because
of the perhaps corresponding historical failures of chemical
regulation in the United States. The Article next examines the
reasons for the failures of chemical regulation.
III. CURRENT APPROACHES TO CHEMICAL REGULATION

A. The Foundations of Chemical Regulation
The starting point of almost all regulation is proof that it is
necessary. Regulation tends to have to justify itself, partly out of
the need to build political will to support the regulation and partly
out of an historical tendency in the United States to view
regulation with suspicion. This need not be the case, although
most would see it as extremely constrictive, if not totalitarian, for
the reverse to exist - for individual and group activity to have to
justify itself to the state. The presumption is that actors can do
whatever they please unless and until they inflict harm on others,
1
58

59

Id. at 1328.
Id.
See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 3.
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with the default condition being that liberal market democracies
permit unimpeded private action. 60 While this presumption is
usually interpreted broadly to enable most activities, productive
activities almost always inflict at least some harm on the
environment.
Hence, environmental regulation is broadly
justifiable and is widely feared by the corporations and industry as
potentially intrusive and confiscatory of the freedom to produce.
History however suggests that the fear is overblown:
environmental regulation like other regulation has the practical
burden of proving its necessity and merit. Regulators do not
control their own destiny in bearing this burden - with every
attempt to articulate, implement, and enforce rules, regulators meet
resistance from both the regulated entities and from the other
instruments of government. Even more broadly, popular will is
something approaching a condition precedent for regulation,
however vacuous and ephemeral such a concept may seem.
Popular will is a construct that may simply represent the
agglomeration of individual perception. But even if so, in a
democratic fashion based on some underlay of majoritarian
sentiment, it exists, and it lurks as an impediment or facilitator to
governmental, corporate, or institutional decision-making.
Popular sentiment tends to mobilize expeditiously in
response to significant stimuli that impact human emotions.
Significant events of a personal nature engender speedy and
pronounced responses.61
People experiencing trauma place
obvious priorities on threat mitigation, as well as retribution
against perceived bad actors. And if there is the possibility of
additional trauma, for example future terrorist attacks, threat
sensitivity may well lead to further exaggerated and inaccurate risk
perception. To be sure, the accuracy of risk perception is a largely
Kysar, supra note 50, at 17. In the United States, the default condition was
created from a constitutional perspective by assertions that the federal
government is one of limited powers and Fifth Amendment protections of
private property rights. The constitutional elements are probably properly
viewed as both the reflection of popular sentiment and the creator of cultural
perceptions.
61 For example, while the entire country was mobilized to one degree or another
following the Gulf Oil Spill, those whose livelihoods were directly impacted by
the spill understandably had the strongest responses.
60
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a chimera, as distinguished from an aspiration - even if the risks
could be precisely measured, the proper course of action may not
be so clear because valuation and aversion to risk vary widely
among communities, let alone individuals. What is clear, however,
is that crises (especially those with a possibility of recurrence) tend
to prompt action, whereas risks that are plagued by uncertainties
lend themselves to analytical processing that tends to be languid
and weak. The observation then is simple: some risks seem
obvious and we react to them quickly and other risks are less clear
and we react to them slowly, often through methods such as costbenefit analysis. 62
The distinction between risks that are addressed speedily in
sometimes emotional ways and those are dealt with through what
is often dilatory and sterile analytics has a strong temporal
dimension. Risks addressed quickly have often come to fruition
and therefore inflicted harm, whereas risks that are uncertain have
not yet clearly inflicted harm, leading many to doubt whether they
are in fact harmful.
Debate ensues ad infinitum with the
quantification of risks taking on a robotic rigidity deferential to
scientific assessments, yet the science does not yield precise results
or clear courses of action. And even when the science becomes
reasonably clear, industry is prepared to manufacture paralytic
doubt - the purveyors of ambivalence ossify the status quo.
Informational voids either cannot be filled except through blunt
estimation or are filled with misrepresentations or prevarications.
Oddly, many environmental law theorists and regulators maintain
hope that the information will come in and that corporations will
help provide us with the information.63 As Wendy Wagner writes,
"[E]nvironmental law innocently assumes that information linking
actors to resulting invisible harms will arise serendipitously, and,
even more surprising, that the actors will either volunteer or accept

62

An

important caveat is that there is also a tendency to fear the unknown,

especially if it is susceptible to the creative capacity of imagination. But some
unknowns such as terrorist attacks are easy to imagine and other unknowns such
as heart disease are more difficult to imagine.
63 Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure ofEnvironmental Law
to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L. J.
1619, 1622-1623 (2004).
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this incriminating information without fuss or fanfare." 64
Corporations, acting rationally to avoid litigation, have a vested
interest in reducing obvious risks for which they are more easily
held accountable, and in making sure that less obvious risks remain
shrouded in uncertainty.
B. The Failure of TSCA to Fill Informational Voids
Some commentators have suggested that if information on
chemical risks will not arise easily and will not be proffered up by
companies that either already have information or could develop it,
then concerted legal or regulatory effort may be needed to develop
the information.65 Recognizing the failure of TSCA to generate
meaningful information on chemical risk, many put hope in
Congress to amend TSCA to revolutionize chemical regulation in
the United States. While the ultimate outcome of TSCA reform is
uncertain, its orientation tends to be toward remedying scientific
gaps in knowledge regarding chemicals. Since the passage of
TSCA in 1976, the EPA has tested only about 200 of the 84,000
chemicals listed on the TSCA Inventory and banned only 5
chemicals. 66 While the 112 th Congress' consideration of TSCA
reform remains to be seen as of the writing of this Article, the bill
considered in the 1 1 1tIh Congress recognized the failures of TSCA
and would have required the chemical industry to provide data to
the EPA to conduct testing, as well as empower the EPA to
mandate testing by companies. In many regards, TSCA reform
looks aspirationally to Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) in the European Union. As its
name suggests, REACH would subject chemicals to layers of
analysis, starting with basic information provision by
manufacturers and importers and continuing with testing of
chemicals based on characteristics including bioaccumulative

64

65

d

1 d. at 1624.
66 The House Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protectionof the
Committee on Energy and Commerce ofthe UnitedStates, 111th Cong. 2 (2010)
(testimony of Steve Owens, Assistant Administrator, Office of Chemical Safety
and Pollution Prevention, United States Environmental Protection Agency).
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capacity, persistence, and toxicity.67 While some maintain hope
that the United States could implement a statutory program similar
to REACH and that REACH itself will compel companies to sell
products globally, including in the United States, that comply with
European requirements, 68 others remain doubtful that the vagaries
of the American political process will produce an outcome
sufficiently protective of consumers any time soon.
C. New Approaches to Chemical Regulation: Duty-toTest and Trespass
In order to bridge the gap between the present and an
imagined future of adequate statutory requirements and
enforcement not undermined by regulatory capture, Albert Lin
favors a legal establishment of a duty-to-test and advocates a cause
of action sounding in public nuisance against companies that fail to
test their products for chemical safety.
As Lin himself
acknowledges, however, this perhaps idealistic notion rests on a
belief that it is possible to test our way out of uncertainty regarding
chemical effects: "[T]he level of toxic ignorance that surrounds us
is not the inevitable result of the limits of scientific inquiry. Rather
it is the consequence of deliberate decisions by the chemical
industry and by those who incorporate chemicals into their
manufacturing processes to avoid testing that would identify at
least some of the likely harms." 69 Lin's intention of essentially
"calling the bluff' of the chemical industry is certainly not
counterproductive, but the creation of a cause of action based on
public nuisance theory for nondisclosure of information assumes
that the disclosure of accurate information, even if it comported
with the standards established by REACH, is sufficiently
protective. However, as Lin acknowledges, it is easy to imagine
the construction of safe harbors that would enable a corporation to
establish compliance with disclosure requirements. 70
The
Albert C. Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public Nuisance to
Compel Chemical Testing, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 955, 998 (2010).
68 See Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond: TransnationalLaw and
the Future of
Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1817, 1823 (2009).
69 Lin, supra note 67,
at 957.
70
Id. at 1010.
67
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difficulty is that it is only possible to disclose what is known, and it
is likely that at any point in time much remains unknown. Of
course it may be the case that a degree of concealment is in fact
occurring, as irrefutably occurred with regard to lead, asbestos, and
tobacco. If this were the case with regard to flame retardants or
other chemical products satisfying the criteria outlined in the
Article, shifting the burden of proof would address the problem industry would have prove that the product was safe. To be sure,
shifting the burden of proof would not result in the divulgence of
concrete proof of harm - corporations would not self-incriminate
because they would want to promote the public perception that
products are safe and would not want to risk liability in the tort
system for prior acts. In summary, by shifting the burden of
proof, if the chemical industry can establish the safety of a
chemical, then all the better, but if not, it strains credulity to
assume that chemical companies would serve up direct evidence of
the harm of their products.
While perhaps all commentators concerned about
environmental health support scientific investigation and the
accumulation of more information regarding the effects of
chemicals, some remain doubtful that scientific testing will
significantly dampen uncertainty surrounding chemical harm.
Among them, Carl Cranor has written of the need for a trespass
model of regulation, whereby "firms seeking to market products
should test substances to determine whether they can invade
human (mammalian) bodies and cross the placenta or be present in
breast milk., 7 1 An affirmative finding would then trigger further
testing requirements with particular attention to developmental
effects.72 The virtue of the trespass approach is that it establishes a
bright-line ex ante standard to attempt to prevent harm. However,
its weakness, apart from the inevitable questions surrounding the
monumental resistance it would receive from the chemical
industry, is that it would simply trigger further testing. This
represents a recognition that the mere presence of chemicals in the
71

Carl F. Cranor, Do You Want to Bet Your Children'sHealth on Post-Market

Harm Principles? An Argument for a Trespass or Permission Model for
Regulating Toxicants, 19 VILL ENVTL. L. J. 251, 252 (2008).
72 See
id
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human body may not motivate a regulatory response 73 - hundreds,
if not thousands, of chemicals are present in all of us, and, perhaps
because we are accustomed to the collective experiment relegating
humans to guinea pig status, cause for alarm must be grounded in
something more than mere physical presence. Thus, in spite of
new ideas such as Cranor's trespass model, the search for proof of
harm continues unabated, as the Enlightenment mentality embarks
on a "rationality project" at the nexus of rational choice theory,
microeconomic efficiency models, and cost-benefit analysis.74
Regulators conveniently become technocrats, wondering if beans
of data will grow into illuminating beanstalks of cost-benefit
analysis. And faced with uncertainty, bean counting essentially
doubles down on itself, with cost-benefit analysis proponents
arguing for the application of a number of methods to bring
certainty to uncertainty. These methods include Delphi analysis
(surveying of experts in relevant fields regarding their assessments
of unknown risks) and Monte Carlo analysis (computer simulations
of policy outcomes in thousands of different possible worlds).
All of these methods however have a unifying feature - they
permit the continuation of cost benefit analysis in the face of
uncertainty.
D. The Failure of Cost-Benefit Analysis to Deal with
Uncertainty
Cost-benefit analysis then pastes a veneer of rationality on
a system afflicted by genuine uncertainty.

Cost-benefit analysis

draws our collective attention to the knowable, thereby further
reinforcing its importance, while simultaneously discounting the
value and meaning of the unknowable. Yet Knightian uncertainty,
or immeasurable risk, remains - despite the best efforts of the
assessors of chemical harm, science tends to languish behind.
While the acute effects (especially death) of chemicals are obvious,
73
74

Id. at 255.

Deborah A. Stone, ClinicalAuthority in the Construction of Citizenship, in
46 (Helen Ingram & Steven R. Smith eds.,
1993).
75 DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 93 (2010).
PUBLIC POLICY FOR DEMOCRACY
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the chronic effects are not. Our rudimentary methods of doseresponse toxicity assessments do not capture the issues of latency
periods, synergistic interactions among chemicals, susceptible
populations such as infants and the elderly, relationships between
genetic predisposition and environmental exposure, and particular
developmental windows. The primary methods used to determine
the potential for chemical harm have changed little over 30 years,
in spite of developments in our understanding of how complex
76
systems operate and chemicals behave.
Complexity theory,
apropos in many environmental and chemical contexts, posits that
complicated systems are often highly fluctuative, adaptive, and
self-reinforcing, exhibiting phenomena such as "fat tail"
distributions in probability graphs, where highly anomalous
occurrences become less anomalous and much more severe than a
normal distribution would predict.n Even rudimentary chemical
research is often scant; more sophisticated chemical research
reflecting complexity theory is practically nonexistent. As Wendy
Wagner writes,
Although scientists have progressed in developing a
mechanistic understanding of cancer, they have
made only limited progress in determining how to
assess, much less screen, hazardous substances for
other harms, such as reproductive, neurological,
hormonal effects, or how to account for variability
in human susceptibility.
Regulators essentially
cross their fingers and hope that current primitive
carcinogenic assessments protect against these other
harms, while toxicologists struggle to develop tests
for amorphous changes in neurological and
endocrine function.

76

See Wagner, supra note 63.

77 See Kysar supra note 50, at
78 Wagner, supra note 63, at
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E. Additional Problems: Individual Beliefs About
Chemicals, Consumption and the Justness of the World
While the problem of ineradicable scientific uncertainty is
formidable, the holy grail of accurate chemical harm assessment is
surrounded by additional layers of complexity relating to decisionmaking structures that are in turn influenced by individual beliefs.
It is, of course, inaccurate to view political actors, corporations,
regulators, and consumers as clearly demarcated and differentiated
groups, and more appropriate to realize that individuals operating
in each of these groups and systems bring with them
preconceptions about how the world operates. The world is filled
with people and their unique beliefs. These beliefs tend to be
heuristical simplifications of a complex world, and they are
certainly useful in eliminating anxiety and promoting a
blissfulness, ignorance, escapism, or belief construction itself. In
order to protect this simplified worldview in which chemicals are
safe and all is well, people take on a certain defensiveness when
presented with the possibility that chemicals can pose dangers.
This stems from two facts: 1) chemicals are immensely beneficial
to our society and are central to modern life and 2) there is a
human need to believe in a just world. There were entire
generations that grew up on propagandistic mantras such as
"better living through chemistry" and the "future is plastics", and
to a large extent, chemicals in consumer products have enabled
considerable improvements in the standard of living. Perhaps even
more important in terms of sculpting individual perception,
consumer products are enjoyable. Noted environmentalist Gus
Speth has stated,
beyond meeting basic needs consumption brings us
pleasure and helps us to avoid pain and, worst of all,
boredom and monotony.
Consumption is
stimulating,
diverting,
absorbing,
defining,
empowering, relaxing, fulfilling, educational,
rewarding. If pressed, I would have to confess that
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I truly enjoy most of the things on which I spend
money. 79
Whether the plush mattress, the car, the HDTV, or the
computer, new consumer products provoke a sense of wonderment,
especially when juxtaposed against historical predecessors. The
comparison, particularly among technological products, leaves us
with a sense of impressive progress, even if the dimension by
which we are measuring improvement is not precisely clear. And
most of us scarcely even broach the question of environmental or
health impacts of the products we are buying - how many of us
questioned the chemical content of the mattresses we have
purchased? Part of the reason for this is that there tends to be an
inverse relationship between a product's benefit and its perceived
risk, hypothesized by some as a way to avoid the discomfort of
dissonance.80 When confronted with the possibility that chemicals
in useful products may pose risks, there is a powerful tendency to
discount the risks and to disparage the people questioning safety as
hyperbolic promoters of a "sky is falling" mentality, concocters of
bogeymen, and "boys who cry wolf." Richard Posner has noted as
a general matter, that there is not a positive noun in the English
language for someone who warns. 8 Instead Posner points out that
we derisively term these people prophets of doom or "Eeyores,"
and when it turns out that their warnings start to come to fruition
we call them "Cassandras". 82 Some may construe warnings as
overly pessimistic doomsaying that is un-American and the mark
of pusillanimous femininity. Perhaps reinforcing a masculinized
construct of invincibility in the context of chemical regulation is
the notion that only pregnant women and children have to be
seriously concerned with chemical exposure.
Ad hominem attacks on warners constitute part of the story,
but people who are convinced that chemical are safe also make
specific defensive, heuristical maneuvers, that are so entrenched
79 JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING 125 (2004).

so See George F. Lowenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267,

280 (2001).
si RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE

DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 143 (2009).
[d.
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that they amount to sayings in the English language: "a small
amount won't hurt you;" "as long as you don't eat it, it's ok;" "it
won't kill you;" "what we don't know won't hurt us;" "don't
worry about it because we are all exposed to it;" "the dose makes
the poison;" and "as long as you aren't a baby or pregnant, then
you will be fine."83 Some of the defensive posturing is slightly
more clever - people will note that everything in the world is made
of chemicals and just because something is manmade does not
mean it is unsafe (e.g. stainless steel), nor that because something
is natural that it is safe (e.g. spider venom). Others will argue that
at a high enough dose, all chemicals, including water, are toxic and
can cause death.84 These views are not simply held by individual
people in society - they agglomerate and emanate upward to
become the shorthand approaches of regulatory agencies. The
FDA, for example, has adopted the "substantial equivalence
doctrine" to evaluate new products for risks, whereby a new
product of similar chemical composition to an already known
product is deemed equivalent and safe.s Commentators have
pointed out the potentially problematic implications of this
approach, especially in the context of the relationship between
genetically modified foods and their nonmodified counterparts. 86
More recently, as it has become clear that hundreds of
industrial chemicals are in our bodies and are reaching the fetus
during gestation, 87 chemical companies, relying on the "dose
makes the poison" argument, have emphasized that the mere
presence of a chemical does not imply that it is causing harm, even
though it turns out that we do not know the level of exposure, the
level that may cause harm, or synergistic effects of chemicals
8 See Kysar, supra note 50, at 17.
84 See PHILIP SHABECOFF AND ALICE SHABECOFF, POISONED PROFITS: THE

Toxic ASSAULT ON OUR CHILDREN 95 (2008) (noting that Alex Avery of the

Hudson Institute is known for stating that in sufficient amounts, "water will kill
you").
85 Kysar, supra note 75,
at 91.
86
Id.
8 Shabecoff, supra note 84, at 45. Body burden
studies have consistently
demonstrated that a variety of chemicals reach the fetus. In 2004 a study of ten
newborns from across the United States found that they had between 154 and
231 chemicals in their umbilical cord blood, implying that the chemicals had
entered the fetus.
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interacting with each other. The response of chemical companies
seeking to maintain revenue streams and avoid liability is not
surprising, nor is the extent to which people want to believe they
are safe - it is a generally adaptive trait that reduces worry and
anxiety and makes it easier for us to get through daily life. Many
observers have emphasized that the desire to reduce cognitive
dissonance is pervasive and powerful - when a chemical product
has unequivocally positive effects, people have trouble accepting
that it may also have negative effects. Psychologist Melvin Lerner
famously observed that the human tendency to yearn for justice is
so powerful that when faced with apparent injustice that cannot be
stopped, we will draw the conclusion that the victim of injustice
must somehow deserve to suffer.89 Jon and Kathleen Hanson have
observed that Lerner's results suggest that "we abhor, not injustice,
but the dissonance that perceived injustice creates within us." 90
Lerner's "just world hypothesis" suggests that the tendency to
eliminate dissonance when confronted with injustice affects not
only isolated situations but our entire worldview: "we do not
believe that things just happen in our world; there is a pattern to
events which conveys not only a sense of orderliness or
predictability, but also the compelling experience of
appropriateness expressed in the typically implicit judgment, 'Yes
that is the way it should be."' 91
When confronted with the possibility that chemicals
present harm, the absence of conclusive evidence is interpreted as
evidence for the absence of harm. Seeking to validate a chemical
production system that serves so many useful purposes, including,
for example, the prevention of mattress fires, the tendency is to
view chemicals as safe, or at least innocent until proven guilty.
Not finding clear evidence of harm, we optimistically assume that
all is well, particularly when we juxtapose the unclear harm against
" Upton Sinclair famously stated, "It is difficult to get a man to understand
something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it." UPTON
SINCLAIR, I CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR, AND How I GOT LICKED 109 (1935).

Jon Hanson and Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial)
Injustice
in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 413, 419 (2006).
90
1Id.
91 MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL
89

DELUSION vii (1980).
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the clear benefits. On the other hand, when clear evidence of
chemical harm does come in, there is a tendency to act quickly to
punish the chemical in question with intensive regulation or
outright bans. This exorcism of dangerous chemicals tends to
affirm the overarching belief that chemicals are safe.
The point in describing common perceptions of the safety
of chemicals is to emphasize the obstacles that effective chemical
regulation faces. Not only are the likely harmful effects of
chemicals extremely difficult to scientifically assess from an ex
ante perspective, but we, all of us, have constructed beliefs, usually
unwittingly, about safety. The mattress case study, to which we
now turn, will illustrate the impediments faced by chemical
regulators and will be used to generate a contextualized approach
for the application of the precautionary principle.
IV. THE MATTRESS CASE STUDY AND A RULE PROPOSAL
A. A Brief History of the American Mattress
The January 1913 issue of Good Housekeeping stated: "All
of us, it is safe to say, have at one time or another slept on a pile of
rags gathered from a city dump and never disinfected." 92 In the
early 2 0 th century, mattress companies were faced with increasing
cotton costs and began to make supposedly new mattresses by
taking the stuffing from old mattresses together with wool rags
obtained from garbage dumps and repackaging it in a new mattress
cover. 93 This was the era in which the admonition "Don't let the
bed bugs bite" had literal meaning. The Good Housekeeping
expose led state governments to respond. 94 States began to pass
laws requiring mattress makers to affix labels to mattresses stating
the material composition and including whether the material was
new or used. The extent to which these laws were adhered to is
unclear, largely because there is little evidence that there was an
92

Curt Wohleber, The Mattress: For Those Seeking a GoodNight's Sleep, Hope

Springs Eternal,AM. HERITAGE OF INVENTION & TECH. Winter 2006, available

at
http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2006/3/2006
93 id.
94

3 4.shtml.
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enforcement mechanism. 95 Few, if any states, had agencies during
this time that actually inspected mattresses. The central issue of
course was that the internal composition of mattresses was not
ascertainable by consumers. Consumers had no way to evaluate
the content of mattresses - as long as the mattresses did not smell
and the outer cover appeared new and clean, the consumers would
live in state of blissful obliviousness, that is until they started to get
sick due to insanitary conditions.
During the 1940s and 1950s innerspring mattresses became
widespread.96 The postwar growth in the middle class and in the
general standard of living allowed many people to spend more on
mattresses, and many of the problems with insanitariness went
away. But a new problem soon developed. In the ceaseless drive
to create a mattress that would sell better and yield more profit,
mattress makers latched on to a new substance: polyurethane foam.
Unfortunately, it turned out that petroleum-based polyurethane is
extremely flammable and people smoking in bed would set the
mattress on fire. As a result, beginning in the 1970s, state
governments, led by California, mandated fire retardant standards
for mattresses. In 1973, the Federal Standard for the Flammability
of Mattresses went into effect to reduce the ignition potential of
mattresses, but notably did not stipulate how flame retardance
could be established, instead deferring to industry to devise its own
methods.
The prevailing method became the usage of
polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs).
Crucially, partly
because the Consumer Product Safety Commission was
implementing and enforcing the regulation, PBDEs escaped the
potentially more stringent review of the EPA. In the decades to
come, many states implemented laws requiring even less mattress
flammability than the federal government, and PBDE usage
became pervasive.
In 2006, the federal government adopted a new federal
standard for mattress flammability, with the CPSC Chairman Hal
Stratton stating: "The rule which we have put in place is the
culmination of careful thought and hard work by Commission Staff
and by private and public sector stakeholders. But most of all, it
9
96

Id.
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was fused by the commitment to improve to improve the safety of
the American consumer. 97 Yet again, however, the CPSC did not
stipulate how mattress companies should achieve compliance.98
Recognizing growing concerns about PBDEs, the CPSC itself
hypothesized that the chemicals used would include antimony
trioxide, boric acid, melamine, decabromodiphenyl oxide,
vinylidene chloride, and ammonium polyphosphate. 99 Most
recently, PBDEs have come under the scrutiny of the federal
government, with the EPA announcing an "action plan" in 2009 to
address the health concerns associated with PBDEs.
This Part will next examine more specifically the crucial
lessons from the experience of mattress flammability regulation in
the United States and use it as the basis to form the proposed rule:
if there is exploitation of the availability heuristic by economically
motivated actors to create systemic demand, then regulators should
shift the burden of proving safety to industry and work to develop
substitute methods to solve the underlying problem.
B. The Availability Heuristic
As previously discussed, the availability heuristic is the
tendency for people to overestimate the likelihood of an event if it
is easy to imagine the event. Research suggests that fires are
particularly vulnerable to overestimation as a perceived threat.
According to Paul Slovic, when respondents were asked to rate the
likelihood of death from different threats, "fire/flame" was among
the categories most prone to overestimation, meaning that people
thought they were more likely to die or be maimed by fire than the
historical evidence suggests. 100
Interestingly, several other
seriously overestimated threats, such as homicide, venomous bites
or stings, and floods, tended to fall into the category of primordial
Press Release, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, CPSC Approves New
Flammability Standard for Mattresses (Feb. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml06/06091.html.
97

98

Id.

99 U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM'N, STAFF BRIEFING ON DRAFT
FINAL RULE FOR FLAMMABILITY OF MATTRESS SETS (2006) available at

http://www.cpsc.gov/LIBRARY/FOIA/FOIAO6/brief/MattressStaff.pdf.
' PAUL SLOvic, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 107 (2004).
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fears that are perhaps evolutionarily developed and justified for
most of our species' existence - perhaps modern man still
perceives threats as a primitive man. 101 Alternatively, perhaps
media coverage tends to highlight house fires and shark attacks.
Whatever the case, the specter of a mattress fire leads to the
development of terrifying mental imagery and the commission of
the availability heuristic error. The tendency to overestimate the
threat of a mattress fire is borne out by the data, which, oddly, the
CPSC uses to justify its extreme actions: "When fully effective,
CPSC estimates the new mandatory [2006] standard for mattresses
is likely to save as many as 270 lives, preventing 78 percent of the
deaths, and 1,330, or 84 percent of the injuries currently occurring
every year." 102 While the deaths of 270 people is a source of
concern, by any measure, the death of 270 number people a year is
small. Some historical perspective is appropriate in order to assess
the 1973 Flammability Standard. In the period from 1965 to 1977,
approximately 35,000 burn cases were reported to the National
Institute for Burn Medicine ("NIBM").103 Of these, fewer than 1%
(269) were caused by beds or bedding, but many of these burns
were quite severe in nature since the victims were usually either
asleep or resting.104 In addition, from this data set, about 83% of
all mattress-burn victims were either smoking or drinking while
burned.1 05 This is not to suggest that smokers and drinkers,
through a theory of contributory negligence, deserve the outcome
that they receive, but instead to highlight that mattresses fires
could be avoided through other means such as norm shifting that
reduce the likelihood that people will smoke in bed.
It is also worth emphasizing that while the CPSC mentions
the injuries that its regulation will prevent, the emphasis is clearly
on saving people's lives. This is part of a recurring regulatory
focus on death which itself results from the ease of imagining
101Id

U.S. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, supra note 97.
Peter Linneman, The Effects Qf Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973
Mattress Flammability Standard,23 J. LAW & EcON. 461, 464. (Linneman
notes, "Private correspondence with NIBM officials suggests that their data
102
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104
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death and hence its susceptibility to the availability heuristic.
Many regulatory approaches are measured in terms of the number
of lives saved. Indeed, there is also evidence that there is a focus
on preventing particularly painful deaths. Cancer is widely
construed to be a painful and usually terminal illness, and there is
little doubt that carcinogenicity is perhaps the crucial criterion in
the assessment of the danger of chemicals. As Stephen Breyer
writes, "The public's fear of cancer currently drives the system."' 06
Why is there such a focus on death and cancer? There are multiple
theories, some of which are in direct tension with one another.
First, preventing death may simply be a proxy for generally
effective regulation - the notion would be that death correlates to
the other outcomes that we are trying to avoid such as injury and
emotional trauma. Second, death is easier to measure than other
possible metrics.
Third, and counterintuitively, people are
desensitized to the idea of death. It may be easier to talk about
how many people died in a war rather than how many people were
terribly maimed. There is also a phenomenon known as Weber's
law, which claims that people's ability to observe changes in a
physical stimulus decreases rapidly as the magnitude of the
stimulus increases.10 7 Applying this to increasing numbers of
deaths implies that there is "psychophysical numbing" of our
ability to appreciate loss of human life. As Joseph Stalin famously
stated, "One death is a tragedy, a million is a statistic." The point
then is that in the context of regulation, people focus on death
because we are surprisingly comfortable with the subject. Fourth,
and in some tension with the third, there is intrinsic human
fascination with the macabre and grotesque, partly resulting from
our fear of it. Most of us are very afraid of death, and the focus on
death in the context of regulation is appropriate. Suffice it to say
that putting these considerations aside pertaining to the underlying
reasons and explanations for the focus on death, the reality is that
106 STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIous CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK

REGULATION 3 (1993).
107 SLOVIC, supra note 100, at 372-73. Weber's law
has been described in the

following manner: "In order for a change in stimulus to become just noticeable,
a fixed percentage must be added. Thus, perceived difference is a relative
matter. To a small stimulus, only a small amount must be added. To a large
stimulus, a large amount must be added to be equally noticeable."
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the concern with death rears itself explicitly and directly in policy
analysis. But negative health effects also must be taken into
account, particularly when there is the likelihood that these will
affect large numbers of people, numbers that are so large in the
context of mattresses as to include the entire population of the
United States.
In the case of mattresses, the reality is that very few people
die or suffer injury in mattress fires, but virtually everyone sleeps
on a mattress. The question facing the regulator is how to
minimize the number of deaths from fire while ensuring safety for
the millions of people who spend one-third of their lives on the
product. The history of mattress regulation illustrates the capacity
for the public and the regulators to fall prey to the availability
heuristic. We are exposing millions of people to flame retardant
chemicals in order to protect against a miniscule number of deaths
that could be prevented through alternate means.
C. Economically Motivated Actors
Having established the power of the availability heuristic to
capture the human imagination, the question becomes whether
certain types of actors exploit the heuristic to their advantage.
Some commentators have observed that economically motivated
actors take advantage of cognitive heuristics to sell products. Jon
Hanson and Douglas Kysar, emphasizing that risk perceptions of
consumers are framed by companies in ways that maximize profits,
state "[o]nce one accepts that individuals systemically behave in
nonrational ways, it follows from an economic perspective that
others will exploit those tendencies for gain." 08 The drumming up
of problems and the advertisement of products to solve those
problems is surely as old as capitalism itself. When problems are
especially frightening, products that can successfully mitigate the
fear and assuage the psychic pain are especially profitable. The
difference that Hanson and Kysar identify is that companies
exploit heuristics in ways that consumers themselves are unaware.
Similarly, Kuran and Sunstein describe the capacity for interested
parties to mount "availability campaigns" that augment fear and
08

Hanson & Kysar, supra note 3, at 635-36.
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create movement in public sentiment that benefits the interested
Kuran and Sunstein emphasize the capacity for
party. 109
exploitation of the availability heuristic by a variety of actors
"[l]ocated anywhere in the social system, including the
government, the media, nonprofit organizations, the business
sector, and even households."' 1o They write: "We have described
the instigators and manipulators of availability campaigns as
availability entrepreneurs. Showing at least a working knowledge
of the availability heuristic and other cognitive processes, these
entrepreneurs seize on selected incidents and publicize them to
make them generally salient to the masses." 11'
Hanson and Kysar go even further. They note that even if
companies are not consciously exploiting heuristics, the profit
incentive will lead them to act as if they are: "Cognitive biases
present profit-maximizing opportunities that manufacturers must
take advantage of in order to stay apace with competition.
Whether by design or not, the market will evolve to a state in
which only firms that capitalize on consumer cognitive anomalies
survive." 112 The search for profit entails that opportunity to
propagate hyperbolic assessments of problems together with
ameliorative products that possess little or no downside risks
apparent to the consumer will continue to its logical conclusion of
profit maximization. The relevant point is that we need not cast
corporations as either malevolent actors seeking to exploit our
thinking or ruthlessly evil juggernauts seeking to inflict harm - the
market system works in a way that companies are not intentionally
doing anything other than make money, and all else follows from
that simple command.
In response, regulators must confront more directly the
implications of corporate law that commands companies to make
profits. While we may tend to characterize corporations as focused
on growth and profit, our personification of the corporation leaves
room for other traits, such as a belief that under certain
circumstances corporations will behave responsibly, sustainably, or
109See

Kuran & Sunstein, supranote 3, at 683.

"0 Id. at 687.

n' Id. at 733.
112Hanson & Kysar, supra note
3, at 726.
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even altruistically. Many in the policy-based and regulatory
community then act with surprise that corporations generally do
exactly what they are required to do under corporate law:
maximize short-term profits for shareholders. What we need to see
anew is that the corporation exists for the corporation.
Corporations will not volunteer information, they will not act
beneficently, morally, or in environmentally sustainable ways
unless the action comports with profit augmentation. The notion
that the market is facilitative of environmental protection, that
robust economic growth can also promote a pristine healthy
environment, 113 has not been borne out in the past 30 years. What
is needed by environmental law is not puerile hostile criticism of
malevolent corporate disposition, but acceptance, at least for now,
that corporations fundamentally do just one thing: maximize shortterm profits of shareholders.
Hoping that corporations will
voluntarily act with a sense of social responsibility is nothing more
than a figment of our collective imagination. The potential to
change corporate law and corporate behavior is beyond the scope
of this Article, but what is within the scope of this Article is to
emphasize that environmental regulators must recognize that they
are dealing with corporations that will ceaselessly and obsessively
maximize profit as they are required to do under law. While the
fundamental tenets of economics suggest that free exchanges in the
market generate value on both sides of the transaction above and
beyond the cost of the trade, and that the increases in wealth
associated with these exchanges in some sense accorded to society
(putting aside distributional issues), history demonstrates that
market manipulation is common, exchanges are not as free as they

113 The Kuznets Curve in the economic literature describes a positive
relationship between national GDP and environmental quality. Its central
criticism is that economic growth in developed countries may be borne of
environmental degradation in developing countries.
In other words,
environmental damage is merely transferred to other locales. Environmental
justice advocates raise evidence for this proposition on an intranational level as
well. Internationally, predictions that developing countries will experience
disproportionate impacts from global climate change relative to wealthy
developed countries in the Northern Hemisphere provide further evidence to
support the idea.
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appear, and the value created by transactions is not as great as we
hope.
The corporate actors in the mattress case study include the
PBDE manufacturers, the mattress manufacturers, and the mattress
retailers. An initial observation is that the chain from mattress
construction to purchase by the consumer involves a formidable
bulwark of corporate entities with seemingly aligned interests in
selling mattresses. While it is commonly supposed that the market
generates value on the basis of competition, it is less commonly
highlighted that variously demarcated industry sectors have
symbiotic relationships with others that reinforce mutual
augmentation - as more mattresses are sold, mattress retailers and
PBDE manufacturers will both make more money. If power
aggrandizement arises across industries involving flame retardant
mattresses, to what extent can we rely on competition within
industries to mollify power concentration? Looking to the relative
level of consolidation in the industry, the trend in the mattress
industry has been toward consolidation, and this trend accelerated
greatly as a result of the implementation of the 1973 Mattress
Flammability Standard. Peter Linneman hypothesized that the
1973 Mattress Flammability Standard benefited large mattress
makers relative to small mattress makers. 114 The underlying
assumption on which this claim was based was that the
flammability standard did not require the development of new
technology - most of the large mattress makers had already
achieved compliance with the flammability standard ex ante.' 15
The reason for this was that sans regulation, the pursuit of a profitmaximizing strategy would still lead to creation of at least some
modicum of flame retardance in the mattress, as manufacturers do
not want to be held liable for dangers associated with obviously
dangerous products. Linneman bolsters his theoretical claim by
noting the importance of fixed costs and barriers to entry.1 1 6 Since
a large part of the compliance costs were fixed costs involving the
process and machinery required for the insertion of flame retardant
materials, many small firms would be less able to absorb this cost
114See
115

Id

116Id

Linneman, supra note 103, at 474.
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since it would be more difficult to distribute the fixed cost over
additional production units. Hence there would be a barrier to
either the continued existence of a small firm or entry of a new
firm. While this theoretical story is intuitively appealing, it means
little unless there are observable phenomena that support it, but
Linneman was able to present data that validated the theoretical
analysis. Among other forms of data, he presented the following:
1) regarding compliance violations, 81% were by firms with
annual sales under $500,000 compared to 5%by firms with annual
sales over $3.5 million and 2) average sales of the smallest firms
fell by 11% while the sales of the largest two groups of producers
rose by 8% and 44% respectively. 1 7 This led to the conclusion
that "large, significant, and predictable income redistributions from
small to large producers resulted from the 1973 flammability
standard."118 Not surprisingly, today in terms of the relative
strength of the largest players, the top four manufacturers of
mattresses and foundations operate about one-half of the 639 U.S.
establishments producing these products.1 1 9
One way that powerful companies stay powerful is by
working to develop rules, laws, and regulations that serve their
interests. Sometimes this simply takes the form of an industry
lobbying the legislature and agencies for beneficial rules and
regulations, or lack thereof.120 Other times, the rules may at least
facially have the intention of serving the public interest, when in
fact they are more likely to serve a particularized corporate interest
and maintain existing power distributions.121 In a statement that
applies readily to both contexts, Adam Smith himself
acknowledged the caution that must be exhibited when it comes to
the interaction between corporations and government:

17 Id, at 474-76.
Id at 478.
Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattresses and
Mattress/Foundation Sets, 70 Fed. Reg. 2470, 2480 (proposed Jan. 13, 2005) (to
be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1633).
120 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character,Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture
152 U. PA L. REV. 129, 202 (2003).
12 1Id at 218.
119
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The proposal of any new law or regulation of
commerce which comes from the [mercantile]
order, ought always to be listened to with great
precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after
having been long and carefully examined, not only
with the most scrupulous, but with the most
suspicious attention. It comes from an order of
men, whose interest is never exactly the same with
that of the publick, and who accordingly have, upon
many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.122
It should come as little surprise then that among the foremost
proponents of the New Flammability Standard was Serta.123 Serta
portrayed its support of the regulation as indicative of the
company's altruistic concern with the safety of its customers,
stating "we believe we have a responsibility to offer safer
mattresses as soon as possible."124
And mattress makers of course do not operate in isolation the flame retardant industry itself has historically been sizable and
extremely consolidated, described by the Chemical Marketing
Reporter as "an oligopoly controlled by Albemarle, Great Lakes,
and the Dead Sea Bromine Group." 125 And while these companies
have recently had to make concessions regarding the sale of their
products due to enhanced scrutiny in at least some states, as will be
discussed below, a recent report on the flame retardant industry
states: "Global flame retardant demand will rise 6.1 percent
annually through 2014. Gains will be driven by trends toward more
stringent flammability standards in the developing world, and by
the rising use of plastic products. The Asia/Pacific region will

122

Ronald Chen and Jon Hanson, The Illusion ofLaw: The LegitimatingSchemas
of Modern Policy andCorporateLaw, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1, 131 n. 501 (2004).
123 Testimony ofAl Klancnik, Serta Group Vice President,before
the U.S. Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation,108th Cong. (July 14, 2004).
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continue to be the largest and fastest-growing market." 126 Even if
there is increasing awareness of the dangers of flame retardants in
Europe and the United States, the game is not up, it is merely
moving elsewhere and creating new markets along the way.
An honest baseline understanding of corporate behavior
must guide regulatory perception and response and our
construction of rules and guideposts to ensure safety. In other
words, if the corporate profit motive is accepted, then palliative
and mitigative measures take on crucial importance and should be
implemented preventively as this Article describes. It is surely the
prerogative of corporations to exploit heuristics such as the
availability heuristic - we should expect nothing less than
avaricious viciousness. This competitiveness and ceaseless search
for profit is precisely what creates the bountiful effects of
capitalism. But in response, having recognized this tendency, it is
within the power of regulators to shift the burden of proof of safety
to corporations before they bring products to market. In concrete
terms from a legal perspective, a statute could be drafted that
would empower regulators who make a finding of corporate
exploitation of the availability heuristic to shift the burden of
proving safety to industry. As will be discussed below, REACH
provides one possible model to suggest how a legal burden can be
shifted. If it is suspected that corporations are exploiting the
availability heuristic, a statutorily empowered agency could look to
evidence of market behavior designed to create systemic demand.
As demonstrated by antitrust laws in the United States, regulators
are capable of observing when there is manipulation of supply.
Evidence of market manipulation of demand could also be
ascertainable, as for example, laws against planned obsolescence
have demonstrated. But how will regulators know when there is
systemic demand construction?

126FREEDONIA, WORLD FLAME RETARDANTS TO

2014 -
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FORECASTS, MARKET SHARE, MARKET SIZE, MARKET LEADERS (2010),
availableat http://www.freedoniagroup.com/World-Flame-Retardants.html.
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D. Systemic Demand Construction
Economically motivated actors working to augment the
availability heuristic create artificial growth in demand. Demand
is understood both in the narrow economic sense of consumer
demand and the broad systemic sense that includes public demand
for quiescence of horrifying thoughts, corporate demand for profit,
and regulatory demand to protect the public interest. More than a
simple bandwagon effect among consumers or a groupthink
mentality within regulatory agencies, demand is comprehensive; it
suffocates dissent and establishes inertial consensus that maintains
the status quo.
Public demand for reducing the fear created by the
availability heuristic, as discussed above, is a major part of the
story, and so too is corporate demand for profit. But there are
additional demand propellants that build on overall demand
construction. First, there is consumer demand itself. Proponents
of law and economics attach a sacrosanct meaning to consumer
purchases because they represent evidence of underlying
individual preferences that come to fruition through seemingly
unfettered choice. At its base, proponents of traditional economic
constructs argue, there are genuine human needs, even if they
merely nakedly and unapologetically represent the need for
prosperity (i.e. greed is good because it improves living standards).
Underlying these claims, however morally grotesque, are,
admittedly, rationalities with a ring of irrefutability. For example,
in the context of mattresses, the development of polyurethane foam
created a superior product for consumers - not only did mattresses
become more comfortable as a result of the soft resilience of foam,
but mattresses became significantly cheaper. And when it became
clear that foam mattresses posed a flammability hazard, flame
retardants provided an easy solution. On its face, any flaws in the
logic of consumer demand are difficult to ascertain.
Viewed in an isolated context, consumer demand for foam
mattresses does not appear problematic because the traditional
market flaws are not apparent. While a strong case can be made
that flame retardants create negative externalities in the form of
harm to public health, it is difficult to predict these externalities by
looking only at consumer demand. Instead, what is needed is to
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view consumer demand in relation to other actors. Most notably,
the possibility of market manipulation arises when the availability
heuristic is exploited by corporate interests. In addition, regulators
themselves, often utilizing methods such as cost-benefit analysis,
are prone to errors that increase demand.
As the gatekeepers of the public interest, especially when
the public-at-large embraces cognitive bias, regulators have a
responsibility to provide a check against demand. While many
view the orthodoxy of cost-benefit analysis as a lens that corrects
irrational demand inflictive of excessive harm, cost-benefit
analysis can legitimize harmful social responses and ineffective
regulations. In the context of mattress fire regulation, benefits of
flame retardant standards were reasonably clear and hence
measured, and the costs in the form of diminished public health
were uncertain and therefore not measured. Cost-benefit analysis
takes into account that which is easily measurable, such as avoided
mattress fire deaths. Moreover, the cost of inserting flame
retardants into mattresses was not especially high, and a large
portion of this cost was in the form of revenue to the flame
retardant maker. The actual cost of the regulation is partially
recoverable under a cost benefit analysis because it is synonymous
with benefits to the flame retardant maker. By saving lives for
relatively little additional increase in mattress prices, the stage was
set for clearing the cost-benefit analysis hurdle with room to
spare.127 In addition, the cost-savings to consumers from being
able to buy cheaper mattresses made from polyurethane foam adds
to benefit side of the ledger, as do the increased revenues from
selling mattresses.
All other things being equal, cheaper
mattresses tend to equal more sales, meaning that the revenues to
the mattress manufacturers, flame retardant manufacturers, and
mattress retailers all are benefits in the analysis. As noted by other
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 744. On a rudimentary level, flame
retardant mattresses fit into the category of a regulatory "no brainer" because the
literal, measurable cost of flame retardants is so little. The regulator is likely to
perceive flame retardant standards as possessing a significant "bang for the
buck." Kuran and Sunstein note examples: "At one extreme, the cost of
regulations on steering columns and space heaters is only $100,000 per saved
life. At the opposite extreme, that of regulations on certain carcinogens cost
well over $10 million per saved life."
127
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commentators, this reveals one of the central flaws with costbenefit analysis: economic output is measured irrespective of
whether it is profligate or superfluous. While government is often
correctly criticized for wasteful spending that involves "digging
holes and filling them back up again," private economic activity
avoids such characterizations and is able to claim that any
judgment of the worth of economic activity is paternalistic and
should be avoided.
On the cost side of the ledger, regulators trying to ascertain
the dangers of flame retardants in the 1970s faced uncertain
terrain. Scientific evidence on the possible health effects of flame
retardants was scant and even today it remains far from conclusive.
Unable to be precisely measured, the possible costs were not
incorporated into the analysis. The implementation of flame
retardant standards for mattresses passed the cost-benefit analysis
test with flying colors. As a result, regulatory demand for flame
retardant standards ensued. Regulatory sanctioning of flame
retardants led to enhanced consumer and public demand, which
then opened the door for further corporate demand: flame
retardants began popping up in a variety of household products
including furniture and electronics. As Douglas Kysar notes,
regulations and public behavior are prone to feedback loops such
that regulatory support for a course of action increases consumer
and public demand, which in turn is interpreted under cost-benefit
analysis as an enhanced benefit of a regulation, thereby further
solidifying the status quo.128
Cost-benefit analysis is also prone to another significant
problem: privatized gains tend to be measurable and therefore
incorporated into the analysis, while public harms, or "socialized
risks," are hard to measure and therefore are left out of the
analysis. The distribution is askew: public harms are borne by all
and result in universal exposure, while privatized gains are
particularized and concentrated. To be sure, the analysis of flame
retardant standards is not reducible to such a simple analysis:
public benefits in the form of a reduced likelihood of death in a
mattress fire and of a reduced price and increased mattress comfort
surely accrue to society, but at what cost in terms of public harms?
128

KYSAR, supranote 75, at 116-17.
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The short answer from an ex ante perspective is that we simply do
not know.
E. What is the Danger?
Faced with uncertainty regarding public harms, why should
there be any cause for concern? It would be hyperbolic to assume
that the mere fact of uncertainty presupposes harm - after all, none
of us really know for sure what the future will bring. That is
precisely why this Article establishes a set of experientially
generated observations that provide guideposts for future action.
Nevertheless, it also is clear that there lurks in the background of
the paradigm a baseline potential for realistic harm, which
constitutes what Stephen Gardiner terms a "credible threat." 29
The precise nature of the threat need not be specified, but the threat
must possess a degree of realism that pulls it down from the realm
of "any imaginable outcome."1 30 Gardiner views this as at most an
implicit condition in his Rawlsian description of a core
precautionary principle that simply points out to potential critics
that we are not in fantasy land, a geography that opponents of the
precautionary principle may inhabit because it allows them to
conjure up bizarre slippery slope scenarios that tie into the
precautionary response.131 Critics assert that even if there is a
slight chance of something going wrong, however outlandish,
precaution will require banning a procedure.132 These critics then
assert that we must rely on the "rationality project" to establish
proof of harm.133 For example, one response to the question of the
safety of flame retardants would have been for the regulators to
conceptualize the problem as a "risk-risk" proposition, with
dangers associated both with allowing mattress fires to persist and
potentially with the health effects of flame retardants.1 34 The
difficulty with this endeavor is that it remains reliant on the
development of conclusive evidence, which may never be
129

Gardiner, supra note 39, at 51.
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id.
Id. at 37.
133 id.
134 Kysar, supra note 50,
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available.
At the same time, the mattress example risks
overgeneralization and excessive extrapolation outward from what
could be an anomalous example. Why should we have any
confidence that the mattress example has general meaning? The
mattress example affords us the benefit of partial hindsight (as the
evidence of harm from PBDEs still remains somewhat uncertain),
but it is first helpful to describe the aspects of the situation that
were problematic before any evidence of harm from PBDEs came
in.
1. Consensus That Engulfs Dissent
From a truly ex ante perspective, the exploitation of the
availability heuristic by economically motivated actors to construct
systemic demand creates several dangers.
First, agglomerated power working in unison steamrolls
potential opposition. Construction of systemic demand leads to a
culture of consensus that suffocates any skepticism and labels
those who warn of potential dangers extremists outside of the
mainstream. This judgment perhaps represents a valuation that
egalitarian dissent is preferable to authoritarianism because it
enables greater freedom of thought and originality that is likely to
generate creative solutions. Specifically, herd mentalities should
justify close scrutiny precisely because they may rest on premises
that have not been fully tested by disparate actors and are therefore
more likely to be incorrect. For example, the widespread
consensus that home prices would continue to go up indefinitely in
the lead up to the recession of 2008-2009 was clearly based on
faulty premises that resulted in massive damage to the economy.
Before comprehensive approaches, whether in the form of
regulatory regimes or economic methods, become entrenched, the
purveyors and accepters of the approaches should test the
assumptions that undergird the potential outgrowth before the
creation becomes too much to control or modify. Having observed
the widespread consensus that exists around the issue of mattress
fires as a major problem, an ex post criticism of the concern as
excessive seems insensitive, until at least the evidence comes in
that the flame retardant solution to the mattress fire problem is
more harmful than the original problem. A danger lies in the
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ossified thinking borne of the inertia that develops when
assumptions are determined to be beyond rebuke.
2. Unjust Enrichment
More concretely, unified thinking tends to enable unjust
enrichment: economically motivated actors can generate profits at
the expense of public health. This stems largely from the failure of
the tort system to handle uncertain or unprovable causality. When
the harm may not show up for decades and its traceability to
particular actors is impossible, the tort system fails. To be sure,
exposing companies to potential liabilities is not the only way to
deter behavior that has negative externalities: in the case of run of
the mill pollution, for example, the government can adopt
regulations or implement taxes that seek to get the price right, and
establish the true cost of a good or service. In the case of
exploitation of the availability heuristic however, the negative
externalities of the products that quell the fear remain relatively
uncertain, especially when juxtaposed against the certain harms
associated with the underlying fear. As a result the risk associated
with the product, in terms of its harm to the environment, tends to
be underestimated, while its benefit is overestimated. When fear
borne of the availability heuristic causes the severity of a problem
to grow in the public consciousness, society overvalues the
reduction of the problem. All of this translates to increases in the
bottom line of the company making the product: product benefits
are overvalued and product costs are undervalued, meaning that
profit accords to the producer in a way that is discordant with a
competitive market that, ostensibly, properly accounts for benefits
and costs.
3. Unsustainable Practices
A third concern from an ex ante perspective is that
superfluous products, almost definitionally, damage the
environment. Lauding products that meet a compelling need not
imply an obsession with austerity, but more positively, a renewed
focus on sustainability. Meaningful sustainability must be more
than carbon footprint reduction and green purchasing - it should
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instead focus on creating, buying, and using only what we need.
Determining what is needed is a tricky subject, well beyond the
scope of this Article. Also, legal paternalism stipulating what a
society needs conjures thoughts of command and control
economies producing only what a nameless, faceless bureaucrat
decides is needed. Suffice it to say that the point of discussing
harm is to conceptualize it in the broader more holistic terms
demanded by a complex system that features nonlinearity and
nonsequentialist relationships. As an example of the complexity of
the system, flame retardant use in mattresses was soon followed by
use in a variety of other products throughout homes, businesses,
and vehicles such as furniture, electronics, car seating, carpet,
textiles, and plastics. Corporate actors use of the availability
heuristic to increase demand and profit, here by applying a solution
for mattress fires to other consumer products, shows the capacity
of the availability heuristic to amplify and augment an existing risk
and thereby increase consumer demand.
4. Market Manipulation
From an ex ante perspective, then, the fundamental story is
that the exploitation of the availability heuristic amounts to one
form of market manipulation, which constitutes one type of market
failure. 135 While economists are quick to acknowledge that market
failures should be corrected, their list of market failures
(monopolies, externalities, information asymmetries, and collective
action problems) overlooks the increasing clarity that consumer
preferences not only are not always individually or aggregately' 36
rational or natural. They can also be potentially harmful, especially
when malleable and manipulable by vested interests.1 37 While it is
convenient to suppose that the problem with flame retardants may
be that they have negative effects not fully accounted for in their
price (an externality problem) or that their possible risks are
merely unknown but knowable (an information problem), the
overarching problem of uncertainty is not fully addressable
135 Hanson
136

137 id.
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through market mechanisms, nor through a tort system that relies
on proof of causality. Uncertainty remains and harm, borne of the
exploitation of the availability heuristic by economically motivated
actors, is a potentiality.
5. Potential Health Effects
Clearly, immersion in an ex ante state, or proverbially
putting ourselves in the shoe of the decisionmakers at the time of
the promulgation of regulations, shows that the potential for harm
is discernible, though perhaps still difficult to determine precisely.
If it were easy to see, of course, we would assume that the demand
for flame retardants probably would have been dampened. What,
then, does the mattress case study reveal with the benefit of
hindsight?
While a comprehensive recitation of the health effects of
flame retardants, some more conjectural than others, is beyond the
scope of this Article, the following summary demonstrates that
there is mounting evidence that flame retardants have serious
impacts on human health and the environment. PBDEs are
brominated flame retardants that are similar in chemical structure
to PCBs, the class of chemicals that was banned in 1977.138 There
are three main PBDE products, Penta-BDE ("Penta"), Octa-BDE
("Octa"), and Deca-BDE ("Deca").139 A large percentage of the
weight of polyurethane foam in mattresses consists of PBDEs,
often as much as 30 percent.140 PBDEs are believed to escape the
products in which they are placed at very high rates.141 While it is
Tracy Daub, California - Rogue State or NationalLeader in Environmental
Regulation?:An Analysis of California'sBan of Bromated Flame Retardants,
138

14 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 345, 362 (2005).
"9
140

Of these, Penta and Octa were taken off the United States market in 2004.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Brominated Diphenyl Ethers 162
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA 13, 64-8 (1994).
141 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, POLYBROMINATED DIPHENYL

ETHERS (PBDEs) PROJECT PLAN (March 2006). The U.S. EPA states "The

mechanisms of pathways by which the PBDEs move into and through the
environment are not known, but are likely to include releases from
manufacturing of the chemicals, manufacturing of products like plastics or
textiles, aging and wear of products like sofas and electronics, and releases at
the end of product life (disposal, recycling)."
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not exactly known how this happens, a study by the Environmental
Working Group found that household dust contained unexpectedly
high levels of PBDEs.142 This provides a route of exposure
through inhalation, ingestion, and dermal contact. Children are
particularly susceptible to exposure through household dust. 143
In terms of the extent of PBDEs in the environment, we
know that all of us, especially Americans, have high levels of
PBDEs in our bodies.144 Certain types of PBDEs are persistent
organic pollutants and also bioaccumulative, meaning that they
build up in people over time. Concerns have become particularly
pronounced of late because several studies have demonstrated both
that the developing fetus is exposed to PBDEs that have
accumulated in the mother and because PBDEs are present in
breast milk. 145 This is especially worrisome because studies also
demonstrate that prenatal and neonatal exposure to PBDEs has
potentially serious effects. Studies with animals have found that
the effects of PBDEs include: impaired memory and learning,
altered behavior, delayed sexual development, and altered thyroid
levels, particularly when the exposures to the PBDEs occur at
crucial developmental periods.146 With respect to mammals the
EPA acknowledges that there are studies that PBDEs have
pharmacokinetic effects, hepatic effects, immunological effects,
endocrine disrupting effects, reproductive effects, and carcinogenic
effects.147 Specific to humans, a study found that there are higher
rates of hypothyroidism among people who were exposed to
brominated flame retardants while at work.14 8 There is lack of
clarity as to whether PBDEs cause cancer in humans. Based on a
142 RENEE SHARP AND SONYA LUNDER, IN THE DuST: Toxic FIRE RETARDANTS

IN AMERICAN HOMES, 17 ( 2004).
14 3 Id. at 25.
14 4

Id. at 10-11.

145 Anita Mazdai, et al., Polybrominateddiphenyl ethers in maternal and fetal
blood samples 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1249 (2003); Daiva Meironyte, et al.

Analysis of Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers in Swedish Human Milk, 19721997. 58 TOXICOLOGY AND ENVTL. HEALTH 329, 329-41 (1999).

EPA, supra note 141, at 361-63.
Id. at 349-50.
148 Danielle Brim, The Roles of Precaution and PoliticalAccountability in
the
Regulation of PolybrominatedDiphenyl Ethers, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L 791,
817 (2005).
146
147
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study in which mice exposed to Deca developed liver, thyroid, and
pancreatic cancer, the EPA classified Deca as a "possible human
carcinogen." 149
The concern surrounding PBDEs has been strong enough to
cause many governmental actors and other entities to take action to
ban and reduce usage. In Europe, companies in Germany, Sweden,
and the Netherlands voluntarily phased PBDEs out of use in the
mid-1980s.15 0 The European Union banned two forms of PBDEs,
Penta and Octa, in 2004 and banned Deca in a majority of
electronic equipment in 2008.'' While this could provide some
hope that differences in corporate law and behavior, consumer
perception, and cultural preferences may be facilitative of
heightened concern for public health, it is important to emphasize
that European countries still permitted flame retardants to be used
for years before they were banned. True prevention eluded even
the Europeans.
In contrast, the United States lags behind. On a practical
level, this means that IKEA mattresses that meet Europeans
standards must be altered to make them more flame retardant for
American consumers. On the federal level, PBDEs are not banned,
although Penta and Octa are no longer produced in the United
States, partly due to decision of the sole domestic producer, Great
Lakes Chemical (now Chemtura), under considerable political
pressure, to terminate their production in 2004.
The EPA
acknowledges, however, that importation may still be occurring.152
By and large, the federal government is still in a research and
assessment phase, with the EPA likely to hinge further regulatory
decisions on TSCA reform in the United States Congress. On the
state level, California outlawed the manufacture and distribution of
Penta and Octa, effective June 1, 2006.153 Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, and Rhode
Island, Oregon, and Washington have adopted laws similar to

149

EPA, supra note 141, at 20.

150 Brim,
151

supranote 148, at 799.

Council Directive 2003/11 2003 O.J. (L. 42), 45 (EC); Council Directive
2002/95 2002 O.J. (1.47), 19 (EC).
152 EPA, supra note 141,
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153 Brim, supra note 144, at 801.
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California, and other states are considering similar laws. 154 No
specific governmental action has been taken at the federal level
with respect to Deca. 15 The reason that is given for the lack of
action on Deca is that Deca is hardly ever absorbed by people.' 56
However, recent evidence suggests otherwise. Deca has been
detected in human hair, fat, blood, and breast milk, sometimes at
high levels.15 7 Perhaps more importantly, when Deca breaks down
in the environment there is evidence that it converts into the more
toxic forms of PBDEs when it loses its bromine ions. At the
state level, Washington has banned the use of Deca in mattresses,
televisions, computers, and upholstered furniture. 159 Maine banned
Deca from mattresses and upholstered furniture in 2008 and from
televisions and other plastic encased electronics in 2010.16 Other
states, including Maryland and Oregon, are considering similar
bans. Some private actors have also taken action, with Wal-Mart
recently banning the use of PBDEs in all goods that it sells.' 6 1
In sum, the evidence of harm from PBDEs is not yet
conclusive, but PBDEs present potential concerns relating to
154 EPA, supra note 137, at 10. While this may provide some evidence that states
have the capacity to respond to corporate exploitation of the availability
heuristic, it more likely demonstrates that there are some political constituencies
and state legislatures that have heightened concern about the impact of
chemicals on human health. There is no evidence that state legislatures passed
flame retardant legislation in response to corporate exploitation of the
availability heuristic, but instead because of the mounting weight of evidence
that PBDEs are harmful.
155 Id.
156 Sharp & Lunder, supra note 142, at
13-14.
157 Id. at
14.

158 Id.
159 See Lisa Stiffler, Limited Ban Placed on Flame Retardants, SEATTLE P-1,
Apr. 3, 2007, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Limited-banplaced-on-flame-retardants-1233199.php.
o60
Press Release, Maine House Democrats, Maine Governor Signs Deca Ban
Bill into Law: State Will Require Phase-out of Flame Retardant in Household
Items
(June
14,
2007)
available
at
http://www.maine.gov/
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161 See Lyndsey Layton,
Wal-Mart Bypasses Federal Regulators to Ban
Controversial Flame Retardant THE WASHINGTON PosT, Feb. 26, 2011,
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02/25/AR2011022502977.html
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developmental neurotoxicity, developmental toxicity, liver
toxicity, and thyroid toxicity.1 62 In addition, there is a substantial
body of evidence linking PBDEs to environmental harms
impacting a variety of wildlife. In spite of these substantial
concerns, PBDE regulation in the United States is partial and
tentative. Part of the reason is that the usual historical rationales
for regulation fail us in this context. For example, going back to
Sunstein's argument about catastrophic and irreversible scenarios
that justify the precautionary principle, the difficulty in countless
examples regarding chemical regulation is that for most of us the
calamitous apocalypse is not coming. In other words, in order to
justify public concern and regulatory scrutiny, we want to see
immediate death from chemicals or rampant debilitating disease
that leads to death, such as cancer. When it comes to IQ points lost
here or there, or asthma, or children born with autism, or early
onset puberty, or an increased incidence of Alzheimer's, we all
may be suffering, some more acutely than others, but life goes on,
and chemicals are weakly regulated. The causal requirements of
tort law fail us. Regulators are captured by industry, and the
wonders of modern life placate us. Infliction of perhaps relatively
small harms on a great number of people does not receive the same
attention of the infliction of large harms on a small number of
people. This is not to say that we should revert to a cost-benefit
calculus more sensitive to multitudinous small harms, but instead
that small harms may be more difficult to notice. Our health is
compromised, even if only when we are old and decrepit. The
mobilizing crisis never comes and our attention is diverted to more
immediate crises, such as mattress fires and oil spills. In this
sense, then, the application of Sunstein's thesis to chemicals
directly undermines effective chemical regulation. Sunstein's
thesis actively propagates continued fetishism of hysteria and
reduces the importance of harm from chemicals by focusing on
mass death: "let us simply understand a catastrophic harm to
involve a large number of human deaths - not thousands, but at
least hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions."1 63 Sunstein also
references Richard Posner's definition of catastrophe as a threat to
162
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the survival of the human race.164 With regard to catastrophe as it
is commonly understood, chemical harms are unlikely to be
catastrophic, even if they include transferable alterations to the
genetic code or endocrine disruption that compromises
reproductive ability. But the potential for serious harm abounds.
V.

THE PRECAUTIONARY RESPONSE

The literature on the precautionary principle is voluminous
and, not surprisingly, there are myriad conceptions of what the
precautionary principle means. Clarity and precision in the
definition of a precautionary response is crucial, if for no other
reason than regulators, faced with unclear commands, may tend to
ignore them. In the context of chemical regulation and the
proposals in this Article, the precautionary response should include
two pieces, with the second contingent on the failure of the first: 1)
shift the burden of proof of the safety of a product from the
government to industry and 2) develop substitute products or
approaches that are safe.
A. Burden of Proof Shifting
The issue is whether the government, seeking to protect the
public and faced with seemingly ineradicable certainty, should
bear the burden of proving the safety of chemicals and products.
When there are sufficient reasons for heightened scrutiny as
outlined in this Article, chemicals should no longer be treated with
the leniency of criminal defendants, innocent until proven guilty the threat that they pose is simply too great. Instead, corporations
must sometimes prove that their products are safe. It is a bizarre
and immensely damaging precedent that chemicals, themselves
and by extension the companies that produce them, are accorded
the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, rather than subject
to, for example, negligence-based duties. The heightened scrutiny
regime this Article proposes strips back this precedent in certain
circumstances and asserts that a corporation does not have a right
to insert a chemical into the stream of commerce unless it is safe.
164
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While many versions of the precautionary principle include
shifting the burden of proof from the government to the regulated
entity, the standard of proof is rarely stated. From the standpoint
of consistency, the standard of proof required to put a chemical
into the stream of commerce should be the same standard required
of the government in order to ban a chemical. As its name
suggests, the burden of proof burdensomely implies the generation
of a certain quantum of evidence - if the burden is in fact shifting
from the government, then it must shift in full: the government no
longer bears any of the burden, and the burden does not otherwise
diminish.
Historically, the government must satisfy a high standard of
proof in order to ban a chemical. Pursuant to TSCA, if the EPA
finds that a chemical poses an unreasonable risk to health or the
environment, then the EPA may implement restrictions "to the
extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using the
least burdensome requirements."1 65 Corrosion ProofFittings v.
EPA16 6 led to the definitive judicial interpretation of this provision
in a case that itself represented the culmination of an EPA effort to
restrict asbestos. After a decade of accumulating scientific
evidence to support its rule regarding asbestos restrictions, the
EPA was nevertheless overturned by a Fifth Circuit court that
found the restrictions were insufficiently supported by the record
and by EPA's analysis. The court found that the language in
TSCA requiring the agency to consider least burdensome
alternatives had not been satisfied by the EPA's methodology and
its incorporation into the analysis of "unquantified benefits."167
One interpretation of the court's decision was that the court
construed the statute to require a heavy dose of scientific evidence
and the agency had simply not been able to provide that science.
Others believe that the court's decision was politically motivated,
with, for example, John Applegate stating that the Fifth Circuit
"happens to be located in the heartland of chemical
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manufacturing." 168 In the aftermath of the Corrosion Proof
Fittings decision, it seems, based on the agency's lack of action,
that the EPA has concluded that it is too difficult to satisfy the
burden of proof required to ban or significantly restrict a
chemical.1 69
While many critics of the CorrosionProofFittingsdecision
argue that TSCA reform is imperative, the supporters of the
decision argue that the failure of Congress to amend TSCA
suggests that the decision was not so contrary to legislative intent
as to require immediate statutory clarification. Recent general
congressional languorousness and ossification probably indicate,
however, that structural political issues, rather than congressional
acquiescence, currently preclude meaningful amendment of TSCA.
In this sense, it could be argued that government's burden of proof
reflected in Corrosion Proof Fittings is a greater burden than
Congress intended. If the stringency of the decision were reduced
and, as a result, the burden of proof borne by the government were
weakened somewhat, the original legislative intent of TSCA may
more fully be revealed. Importantly for this Article, if the burden
of proof shifts from the government to industry, then the burden
should also be slightly lower than it currently is.
In the context of burden shifting, David Dana, on the other
hand, rather than supporting an only slightly less burdensome
standard than is currently required of the government, recommends
a much weaker burden of proof to be borne by industry, stating:
[b]ecause the principle leaves open how much proof
of safety is required, it arguably is better understood
as merely shifting the burden of production - that is,
advocates of a certain activity that is suspected of
causing a health and environmental risk must
produce at least some factual evidence or theory in
support of the conclusion that the activity is
acceptably safe. 170
John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: PracticalPrinciplesfor
Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 EcOLOGY L.Q. 721, 737 (2008).
169 ELIZABETH C. BROWN ET AL. TSCA DESKBOOK 58 (1999).
170Dana, supra note 3, at 1345
n. 4.
168

260 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18

However, it strains credulity to suppose that lack of
preexisting standard of proof implies that when we first articulate
it, it should be incredibly lenient in a way that is massively
discordant with the standard of proof that the government has
assumed for decades. It would be exceedingly facile for a
corporation to comply with Dana's proposal. The precautionary
principle must be understood as something more than a mechanism
for laying the groundwork for litigation and instead as a regulatory
approach that ensures safety. Once we are in the realm of
heightened scrutiny, the standard of proof assumed by industry
should approximate the standard of proof borne by the government
under the current regime, or at least comportional with the
legislative intent of TSCA, notwithstanding the Corrosion Proof
Fittings decision. It may well be the case that industry will not be
able to meet this standard, and if so then the second step - the
development of substitutes - would be triggered.
B. Development of Substitute Approaches and
Products
In recognition of the severity of the underlying problems,
whether mattress fires, terrorist attacks, or oil spills, that are
subject to the availability heuristic, even if they are hyperbolized,
substitute approaches to address the problem should be developed.
It is important to emphasize that the approaches should be
comprehensive, broad-based, and multidimensional - while the
development of a substitute chemical may be one way to solve the
problem, governments can work to develop new laws (e.g.
mandating smoke detectors) and companies can engage in research
and development, perhaps subsidized or otherwise incentivized by
the government, to develop new substitute products.
As the mattress case study illustrates, a strong foundation
for the narrower approach of the development of safe chemical
substitutes may be found in the REACH system in the European
Union. After the application of REACH's chemical testing
provisions leads to a determination that certain chemicals are a
cause for concern, REACH establishes substitution requirements
and incentives, seeking to "encourage and in certain cases to
ensure that substances of high concern are eventually replaced by
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less dangerous substances or technologies where suitable
economically and technically viable alternatives are available."' 7
To be sure, the "substitution plan" envisioned by REACH inhabits
the realm of technical voluntariness and collaborative relations
between government and industry in order to develop new safer
chemicals. But it also relies on the stigmatization resulting from
deeming a chemical dangerous in order to generate market-based
reactions relying on consumer aversions to potentially dangerous
chemicals. Simple information dissemination and transparency
clearly can play a role in generating demand-side reactions that
force suppliers to change behavior.
Nongovernmental
organizations can play a role as well - an NGO project called the
Substitute It Now! (or SIN!) List currently lists 356 chemicals that
are identified as substances of concern based on REACH criteria.
By disclosing dangerous chemicals and stating which products
contain them, consumers stand to increase the pressure on
producers to develop safer alternatives.
Opponents of the precautionary principle often falsely
claim the benefit provided by a product can only be obtained by
the particular product in question - we must choose between
mattress fires and flame retardants. The proponents of flame
retardants tend to suggest that the critics of flame retardants fail to
appreciate the dangers of fires. In the defense of chemical
production and usage, supporters tout flame retardants as a triumph
of human engineering that save lives, insinuating that the critics of
PBDEs are merchants of death. This polarizing characterization of
the issue overlooks the fact that critics of flame retardants
centralize the importance of health and safety, not just in terms of
prevention of fires but also in terms of management of long term
chemical exposures. Critics of PBDEs recognize both the dangers
of fires and the dangers of PBDEs, and have worked to avoid both
problems through the development of alternative methods to
counteract the underlying problem.
In the case of mattress fires, the cause of the problem was
the polyurethane foam in the mattress, which allowed
manufacturers to reduce the cost of making mattresses, as well as
Commission Regulation 1907/2006, Registration, Evaluation, Authorization,
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 2006 O.J. (L 396).
171
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the price paid by consumers, and also provided superior comfort
and quality to non-polyurethane foam mattresses. As an opening
maneuver, polyurethane foam could be eliminated and
manufacturers could make mattresses of cotton and wool as they
were in the pre-polyurethane days. It strains credulity to suppose
that the elimination of relatively inexpensive polyurethane foam
would raise the price of a mattress so tremendously as to make it
unaffordable for consumers. However, if this were the case, then
owing to the relatively inelastic demand for mattresses,
government could subsidize mattress purchases by providing tax
credits to those who buy a mattress and are below a certain income
level or by providing the equivalent of a "food stamp" for
mattresses. With regard to the possible diminution in mattress
comfort if polyurethane foam were eliminated, it is plausible that
market innovations could lead to the development of new
comfortable substances that are not flammable.
Critics of substitution emphasize that regulators are often
faced with an array of choices which function as substitutable
outcomes, but that each of these outcomes possesses different costs
and benefits that must be converted into the common currency of
dollars. Termed "risk-risk tradeoffs," substitution regimes can
initiate a string of substitutes, each problematic in its own regard,
and emanating outward from the originally identified problem.172
For example, if the original problem is mattress fires, then the
"first-order" substitute is PBDEs, and the "second order" substitute
could be a flame retardant chemical other than PBDEs. 7 3 These
critics claim that to stop the substitution analysis at a particular
point in the sequence is arbitrary and represents a value judgment
that certain substitutes are worse by virtue of their temporal
As this Article has
proximity to the original problem.
demonstrated however, these "first order" substitutes are not
problematic because they happen by sheer chance to be conceived
soon after the development of the original problem - they are
problematic because they develop in response to an economically
motivated actor exploiting the availability heuristic to construct
demand. The experiential record does in fact suggest that the "first
172
173
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order" substitute is problematic precisely because it is an offshoot
not only of a cognitive bias, but also of a cognitive bias that is
selfishly exploited for economic gain. Those who genuinely treat
the original problem as more likely to be harmful than the "first
order" substitute are not only potentially the victims of the
availability heuristic, but also the unwitting victims of the
economically motivated actors exploiting the heuristic.
The analysis of course cannot stop there, but must continue
on to second order substitutes and all other possible substitutes.
Critics of the precautionary principle have correctly pointed out
that second order substitutes may be just as harmful as first order
substitutes. Indeed, it may, and for this reason all responses to our
by now familiar confluence of circumstances should be evaluated
in the context of safety thresholds in which the burden of proof is
satisfied. If for example, we simply substituted asbestos in
bedding for PBDEs, we would not be reaching a sufficient level of
protection. Once the need for heightened regulator scrutiny is
triggered, then the industry must satisfy the burden of proof for all
of its proposed responses.174 Once we find ourselves in the domain
of the precautionary principle, then the precautionary principle
should attach to all responses triggered by the original taint.
Faced with the burden of demonstrating safety for all of its
desired responses to the original problem, industry may not be able
to bear the burden, just as the government is often unable to bear
the burden of establishing that a product is unsafe. However,
history has demonstrated that environmental regulations have the
potential to be technology forcing and there may well be new
products developed that could address the underlying problem.
While in many cases it will be economically advantageous for a
company to work to develop a substitute through its own research
and development, it also may be the case that industry will not step
up to solve the problem on its own. To the extent that the
government views the original problem (e.g. mattress fires) as
174

Dana supra note 39, at 5-6 (citing Marko Ahteensuu who states that "[i]f a

precautionary response to a threat imposed another risk . . . that is regarded as

unacceptable, both risks should be considered symmetrically" and Per Sandin
who states that the precautionary principle should be "applied also to the
precautionary measures prescribed by the precautionary principle itself').
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requiring redress, it may well be the case that industry will have to
adapt. Hopefully, industry, regulators, and society-at-large can
begin to focus on first principles referential to meaningful goals
rather than continue to engage in obsessive devolutionist searches
for safer substitutes that preclude holistic and comprehensive
assessments of problems. Citing references to "best available
pollution abatement technology" in federal statutes, Douglas Kysar
notes that "doing the best you can" reflects "great collective
commitment to the preservation of human life and the environment
without requiring satisfaction of Herculean informational demands
by regulators." 17
Substitutability can be less a search for a safe
substitute (although that is possible) and more a search for
"contextual rationality."1 76 Most obviously in the mattress case
study, it would also be the prerogative of industry to lobby the
government for alternative forms of regulation such as mandated
smoke alarms or sprinkler systems that perhaps could get the
government comfortable that the original problem was sufficiently
addressed. In a world in which attention to death and injury from
car accidents led first to seat belts, then to air bags and cars
designed to protect the cabin in the event of collisions, and now to
cars that promise to brake themselves and eventually drive
themselves, we should not underestimate the potential for market
innovations to generate solutions to problems. Perhaps market
innovators could develop similar safeguards for the mattress as
they have for the automobile. More ambitiously, the government
could aggressively outlaw certain behaviors, and if beyond the
reach of enforcement, could still influence behavior. For example,
anti-littering laws, while sporadically enforced, have changed the
social acceptability of throwing trash out of a car window.
Likewise, as fantastical as it seems today, if the government were
to outlaw smoking in all buildings including private homes or,
even more ambitiously, outlaw smoking altogether, evidence
suggests that the vast majority of mattress fires would disappear.
While laden with value judgments, perhaps society, acting through
its elected representatives, would do well to decide whether it
places greater value on the right to smoke or the right to be free
Kysar, supra note 50, at 24.
"7Dana, supra note 39, at 30-32.
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from flame retardant exposure. Solving the mattress fire dilemma
of course need not be reduced to such choices. But regulators and
policymakers should comprehensively consider alternative
approaches and substitute methods, rather than simply acquiesce to
systemic demand generated from corporate exploitation of the
availability heuristic.
VI. CONCLUSION

The question we face is whether environmental law and
chemical regulation should continue to be largely mitigative rather
than preventive. The central feature of preventive action is that it
tends to rely on suppositions and unprovable assertions - its
forward-looking nature implies uncertainty. The central feature of
mitigative action is that it allows the damage to occur and then
works to clean it up with the hope that the damage is reversible.
Environmental degradation all too often is irremediable - species
become extinct, habitat is lost forever, health effects are
permanent, and chemicals are persistent and bioaccumulative.
Faced with the choice between preventive action and mitigative
action, the question is whether we can turn preventive action into
something more methodologically rigorous. This Article proposes
one set of circumstances that justifies precautionary action.
Other commentators have identified other applicable
triggers and further research and analysis may well suggest several
additional situations that demand application of the precautionary
principle. While some scholars claim that the situations facing
regulators are highly unique and contextualized, this Article
demonstrates that it is possible to provide regulators with general
guidance that should require the implementation of legal
procedures. The fact that a company is seeking a profit is of
course the foundation of a capitalist economic system that has
generated immense bounty and led to significant improvements in
living standards. And even when paired with the availability
heuristic, the existence of economically motivated actors
constructing systemic demand should not automatically imply that
something is awry. But it does create the possibility that the public
interest and, more specifically, environmental and health interests,
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which regulators are supposed to be protecting, could be in
jeopardy.
While the search for objective truth, especially in the
context of environmental health regulation, will remain a work in
progress, contextual rationality based on experiential evidence can
help to tell us when to be concerned. The observable triggers
described in this Article could lead to the creation of additional
procedures consistent with mitigating the risk of threat to the
environment, health, and safety while simultaneously allowing
expression of other values such as the ability of the people to
operate in a free market, of companies to sell products, and of
people to buy them. If we accept certain critiques of a wholesale
precautionary principle, not the least of which is the practical
impossibility of achieving its implementation in an American
society that centralizes the importance of economic growth, then
the best we may be able to do is establish warning signals that will
alert us of the need for greater scrutiny.

